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In 1969, the year Neil Armstrong became the first per-
son to walk on the moon, the precursor to the Internet—
then known as ARPANET—was brought online. The 
first host-to-host message was sent from a computer at 
the University of California, Los Angeles, to a computer 
at Stanford University, and it read “lo”: The network 
crashed before the full message, “login,” could be trans-
mitted. Fast forward half a century from this first step 
into cyberspace, and the Internet has evolved into a 
ubiquitous global digital environment, populated by 
more than 4.5 billion people and entrenched in many 
aspects of their professional, public, and private lives.
The Role and Responsibility of 
Psychological Science in the Digital Age
The evolution of digital technologies has given rise to 
possibilities that were largely inconceivable in 1969, 
such as instant worldwide communication, mostly unfet-
tered and constant access to information, democratized 
946707 PSIXXX10.1177/1529100620946707Kozyreva et al.Cognitive Tools for the Digital World
research-article2020
Corresponding Author:
Anastasia Kozyreva, Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck 
Institute for Human Development 
E-mail: kozyreva@mpib-berlin.mpg.de
Citizens Versus the Internet: Confronting 
Digital Challenges With Cognitive Tools
Anastasia Kozyreva1, Stephan Lewandowsky2,3, and  
Ralph Hertwig1
1Center for Adaptive Rationality, Max Planck Institute for Human Development; 2School of  
Psychological Science, University of Bristol; and 3School of Psychological Science,  
University of Western Australia
Abstract
The Internet has evolved into a ubiquitous and indispensable digital environment in which people communicate, seek 
information, and make decisions. Despite offering various benefits, online environments are also replete with smart, 
highly adaptive choice architectures designed primarily to maximize commercial interests, capture and sustain users’ 
attention, monetize user data, and predict and influence future behavior. This online landscape holds multiple negative 
consequences for society, such as a decline in human autonomy, rising incivility in online conversation, the facilitation 
of political extremism, and the spread of disinformation. Benevolent choice architects working with regulators may 
curb the worst excesses of manipulative choice architectures, yet the strategic advantages, resources, and data remain 
with commercial players. One way to address some of this imbalance is with interventions that empower Internet users 
to gain some control over their digital environments, in part by boosting their information literacy and their cognitive 
resistance to manipulation. Our goal is to present a conceptual map of interventions that are based on insights from 
psychological science. We begin by systematically outlining how online and offline environments differ despite being 
increasingly inextricable. We then identify four major types of challenges that users encounter in online environments: 
persuasive and manipulative choice architectures, AI-assisted information architectures, false and misleading information, 
and distracting environments. Next, we turn to how psychological science can inform interventions to counteract these 
challenges of the digital world. After distinguishing among three types of behavioral and cognitive interventions—
nudges, technocognition, and boosts—we focus on boosts, of which we identify two main groups: (a) those aimed at 
enhancing people’s agency in their digital environments (e.g., self-nudging, deliberate ignorance) and (b) those aimed 
at boosting competencies of reasoning and resilience to manipulation (e.g., simple decision aids, inoculation). These 
cognitive tools are designed to foster the civility of online discourse and protect reason and human autonomy against 
manipulative choice architectures, attention-grabbing techniques, and the spread of false information.
Keywords
attention economy, behavioral policy, boosting, choice architecture, cognitive tools, decision aids, disinformation, 
false news, media literacy, nudging
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production and dissemination of information and digital 
content, and the ability to coordinate global political 
movements. The COVID-19 pandemic and resulting 
lockdowns serve as a striking example of just how indis-
pensable the Internet has become to the global econ-
omy as well as to citizens’ well-being and livelihood. 
With much of the world stuck at home, the Internet is 
one of the most important tools for connecting with 
others, finding entertainment and information, and 
learning and working from home. But as the popular 
adage goes, there is no such thing as a free lunch. Digi-
tal technology has also introduced challenges that 
imperil the well-being of individuals and the functioning 
of democratic societies, such as the rapid spread of false 
information and online manipulation of public opinion 
(e.g., Bradshaw & Howard, 2019; Kelly et al., 2017), as 
well as new forms of social malpractice, such as cyber-
bullying (Kowalski et  al., 2014) and online incivility 
(A. A. Anderson et al., 2014). Moreover, the Internet is 
no longer an unconstrained and independent cyberspace 
but, notwithstanding appearances, a highly controlled 
environment. Online, whether people are accessing 
information through search engines or social media, their 
access is regulated by algorithms and design choices 
made by corporations in pursuit of profits and with little 
transparency or public oversight. Government control 
over the Internet is largely limited to authoritarian 
regimes (e.g., China, Russia); in democratic countries, 
technology companies have accumulated unprecedented 
resources, market advantages, and control over people’s 
data and access to information (Zuboff, 2019).
This hidden commercial regulation has been brought 
into sharp focus by several scandals implicating the 
social-media giant Facebook in unethical dealings with 
people’s data (“The Cambridge analytica files,” 2018). 
Regulators and the general public have awakened to 
the extent to which digital technologies and tech com-
panies can infringe on people’s privacy and control 
access to information. Furthermore, these scandals have 
revealed the manipulative power of techniques such as 
“dark ads” (advertising messages that are visible only 
to those who are targeted by them) and microtargeting 
(customizing advertisements to particular individuals), 
which are meant to influence people’s decision-making 
and voting behavior, by exploiting their psychological 
vulnerabilities and personal identities (e.g., Matz et al., 
2017). There is clearly no panacea for solving these 
problems. Instead, there are multiple entry points for 
addressing the existing and emerging challenges (Fig. 
1; see also Lazer et al., 2018). We argue that psychologi-
cal science is indispensable in the analysis of the key 
challenges to human cognition and decision-making in 
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Fig. 1. Entry points for policy interventions in the digital world: legal and ethical, 
technological, educational, and socio-psychological. Each entry point is shown with 
examples of potential policy measures and interventions. Entry points can inform 
each other; for instance, an understanding of psychological processes can contrib-
ute to the design of interventions for any entry point, and regulatory solutions can 
directly constrain and inform the design of technological and educational agendas. 
Icons are used under license from Adobe Stock.
Cognitive Tools for the Digital World 105
The first entry point for interventions comes from 
the normative realm of law and ethics; this includes 
legislative regulations and ethical guidelines—for exam-
ple, ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI by the High-
Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (2019) or 
the European Union (EU) Code of Practice on Disin-
formation (European Commission, 2018); for an over-
view of misinformation legislative actions worldwide, 
see also Funke and Flamini (2019). Regulatory interven-
tions can, for instance, introduce transparent rules for 
data protection (e.g., the EU’s General Data Protection 
Regulation [GDPR]; European Parliament, 2016) or for 
political campaigning on social media and can impose 
significant costs for violating them; they can also imple-
ment serious incentives (and disincentives) for tech firms 
and the media to ensure that shared information is reli-
able and online conversation is civil. Regulatory initia-
tives should strive to create a coherent user-protection 
framework instead of the fragmentary legislative land-
scape currently in place (e.g., for Germany and the EU, 
see Jaursch, 2019).1
The second entry point for interventions is techno-
logical: Structural solutions are introduced into online 
architectures to mitigate adverse social consequences. 
For example, social-media platforms can take techno-
logical measures to remove fake and automated 
accounts, ensure transparency in political advertise-
ment, and detect and limit the spread of false news 
using automated or outsourced fact-checking (e.g., 
Harbath & Chakrabarti, 2019; G. Rosen et  al. 2019). 
However, such measures are mainly self-regulatory, 
depend heavily on the company’s good will, and are 
often introduced only after considerable public, politi-
cal, and regulatory pressure.
The third entry point for interventions is educational. 
These interventions are directed at the public as recipi-
ents and producers of information—for example, school 
curricula for digital-information literacy that teach stu-
dents how to search, filter, evaluate, and manage data, 
information, and digital content (e.g., Breakstone et al., 
2018; McGrew et al., 2019).
Finally, the fourth entry point for interventions comes 
from psychological and social sciences and includes 
behavioral and cognitive interventions: Here, nonregu-
latory, nonmonetary policy measures are implemented 
to empower people and steer their decision-making 
toward greater individual and public good. In online 
behavioral and cognitive policy making, which is the 
main focus of this article, there are three notable 
approaches to designing interventions. The first is 
nudging, which aims to guide people’s behavior 
through the design of choice architectures (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). The second is boosting, which seeks 
to improve people’s cognitive and motivational 
competencies (Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017). The 
third is technocognition, which aims to design techno-
logical solutions resting on and informed by psycho-
logical principles identified in the study of human 
cognition (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & Cook, 2017).
These four entry points for interventions—coming 
from law, technology, education, and psychological 
science—are interrelated, and they can and should 
inform each other. For example, regulations on the 
ethical design of digital technologies should inform 
technological, educational, and behavioral interven-
tions. Moreover, understanding psychological processes 
is essential for all four approaches; for instance, behav-
ioral and cognitive insights can be useful for designing 
both educational and technological tools as well as 
regulatory interventions.
In this article we are concerned specifically with 
behavioral and cognitive interventions. Our main aim is 
to identify key challenges to people’s cognition and 
behavior in online environments and then to present a 
conceptual map of our preferred cognitive intervention: 
boosting. We focus on boosts for several reasons. First, 
we hold that the philosophy of the Internet is one of 
empowerment (e.g., Deibert, 2019; Diamond, 2010; 
Khazaeli & Stockemer, 2013). This is reflected in the 
EU’s approach, which highlights citizen empowerment 
as a goal of European digital policy (European Commis-
sion, 2020). The president of the European Commission 
echoed this sentiment, stating that “Europe’s digital tran-
sition must protect and empower citizens, businesses 
and society as a whole” (von der Leyen, 2020, para. 11). 
Second, although the call to increase people’s ability to 
deal with the challenges of online environments is 
growing louder (e.g., Directorate-General for Commu-
nications Networks, Content and Technology, 2018; 
Lazer et al., 2018), there has been no systematic account 
of interventions based on insights from psychological 
science that could form the foundation of future efforts. 
Third, the Internet is a barely constrained playground 
for commercial policy makers and choice architects act-
ing in accordance with financial interests; in terms of 
power and resources, benevolent choice architects in 
the public sector are at a significant disadvantage. It is 
therefore crucial to ensure that psychological and 
behavioral sciences are employed not to manipulate 
users for financial gain but instead to empower the 
public to detect and resist manipulation. Finally, and 
crucially, boosts are probably the least paternalistic mea-
sures in the toolbox of public-policy makers and poten-
tially the most resilient in the face of rapid technological 
change, in that they aim to foster lasting and generaliz-
able competencies in users.
We begin by comparing online and offline environ-
ments to prepare the ground for considering the impact 
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that new digital environments have on human cognition 
and behavior (Systematic Differences Between Online 
and Offline Environments section). Second, we consider 
the challenges that people encounter in the digital 
world and show how they affect users’ cognitive and 
motivational abilities. We distinguish four types of chal-
lenges: persuasive and manipulative choice architec-
tures, AI-assisted information architectures, false and 
misleading information, and distracting environments 
(Challenges in Online Environments section). Third, we 
turn to the question of how to counteract these chal-
lenges. We briefly review the types of behavioral and 
cognitive interventions that can be applied to the digital 
world (Behavioral Inventions Online: Nudging, Tech-
nocognition, and Boosting section). We then identify 
four types of cognitive tools: self-nudging, which aims 
at enhancing people’s agency in their digital environ-
ments; deliberate ignorance, which can be used as a 
tool for information management; simple decision aids, 
which can help people accurately assess content they 
encounter online; and inoculation, a preemptive inter-
vention that aims to boost people’s resilience to online 
misinformation and manipulation (Boosting Cognitive 
Competencies in Online Environments section). These 
tools are designed to foster the civility of online dis-
course and protect reason and human autonomy against 
manipulative choice architectures, attention-grabbing 
techniques, and the spread of false information. We con-
clude with a brief discussion of how psychological sci-
ence can help create an Internet for citizens.
Systematic Differences Between Online 
and Offline Environments
The Internet and the devices people use to access it 
represent not just new technological achievements but 
also entirely new artificial environments. Much like 
people’s physical surroundings, these are environments 
in which people spend time, communicate with each 
other, search for information, and make decisions. Yet 
the digital world is a recent phenomenon: The Internet 
is 50 years old, the Web is 30, and the advanced social 
Web is merely 15 (for definitions, see Table 1). New 
adjustments and features are added to these environ-
ments on a continuous basis, making it nearly impos-
sible for most users, let alone regulators, to keep abreast 
of the inner workings of their digital surroundings.
Online reality tends to be seen as different from the 
physical world, and computer-mediated social activities 
are often described as inferior substitutes for real-life 
or face-to-face interactions (for an overview, see Green 
& Clark, 2015). However, this presumed dualism 
between online and offline worlds is becoming more 
problematic—and possibly obsolete—as the line sepa-
rating the two environments continues to blur. The 
ubiquitous nature of computing2 and the integration of 
digital devices and services into material objects (e.g., 
cars) and actions in the physical world (e.g., navigation) 
make it difficult to delineate when one is truly online 
or offline—a phenomenon that Floridi (2014) called the 
“onlife experience” (p. 43). This effect is highly visible 
in computerized work environments, where more and 
more of people’s working time is spent online. Accord-
ing to a report by the European Commission (2017), 
the use of digital technologies has increased signifi-
cantly in the past 5 years in more than 90% of work-
places in the EU, and most jobs now require at least 
basic computer skills.
That said, the digital world differs from its offline 
counterpart in ways that have important consequences 
for people’s online experiences and behavior. We will 
proceed by outlining several ways in which online 
ecologies do not resemble offline environments. A sys-
tematic understanding is required not only to fill the 
gaps in knowledge of the psychologically relevant 
aspects of the digital world but also to ensure that 
psychological interventions take into account the specif-
ics of these new environments and the particular chal-
lenges that people are likely to face there. First steps 
have already been made. Marsh and Rajaram (2019) 
identified 10 properties of the Internet—including 
accessibility, unlimited scope, rapidly changing content, 
and inaccurate information—that they organized into 
three categories: (a) content (what information is avail-
able), (b) Internet usage (how information is accessed), 
and (c) the people and communities that create and 
spread the content (who drives information). They 
argued that these properties can affect cognitive func-
tions, such as short-term and long-term memory, and 
reading, and have an effect on social influence online. 
Other relevant classifications summarizing the differ-
ences between online and offline environments in the 
context of social media include those provided by 
McFarland and Ployhart (2015)3 and Meshi et al. (2015).4
We expand on these classifications by focusing on 
two broad types of differences between online and 
offline ecologies: differences in structure and function-
ality and differences in perception and behavior (i.e., 
how people perceive the online and offline worlds and 
how their behavior might differ accordingly). A list of 
characteristics of online environments can be found in 
Table 2, which is followed by a detailed discussion of 
each characteristic.
Differences in structure and functionality
Group sizes. In 2020, there are more than 4.6 billion peo-
ple (or almost 60% of the global population) and around 30 
billion devices connected to the Internet.5 Digital technolo-
gies have changed the public sphere, connecting people 
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separated in both time and space and creating the “digital 
public” (Bunz, 2014). Indeed, one of the predominant uses 
of the Internet is for communication. The social Web boasts 
impressive numbers of users: In the third quarter of 2020, 
Facebook alone had 2.7 billion active monthly users 
(Statista, 2020c), and the Chinese WeChat more than 1.2 
billion (Statista, 2020d). According to Our World in Data, 
“social media platforms are used by one-in-three people in 
the world, and more than two-thirds of all Internet users” 
(Ortiz-Ospina, 2019, para. 2). Online, one can broadcast a 
message to audiences of millions, whereas in face-to-face 
communication, there are physical limits to how many 
people can join a conversation (Barasch & Berger, 2014). 
Yet even though social media enables people to establish 
larger social networks and profit from greater global con-
nectivity, the structures of social circles online and the 
number of close friends people have online do not signifi-
cantly differ from their offline counterparts (Dunbar et al., 
2015).6 In online social networks, the average number of 
friends (between 100 and 200) as well as the number of 




AI-powered algorithmic tools that filter and mediate information online (e.g., targeted advertising, 
personalized recommender systems, algorithmic filtering in search engines, personalized curation 
of news feeds on social media; see Figure 3 for an overview).
Algorithm In the context of digital environments, a computer program that orders, classifies, generalizes, 
predicts, and filters information online. Algorithms can be rule-based (i.e., instructions are 
programmed by humans) or self-learning programs (“machine learning”).
Artificial intelligence (AI) In the context of digital environments, mainly refers to self-learning computer programs (“machine 
learning”) that analyze people’s personal data and digital footprints to customize their online 
experience. Also includes fields such as robotics, knowledge representation and reasoning, 
planning, and computer vision.
Boost Cognitive intervention that aims to foster people’s competencies. Boosts target cognition (e.g., 
simple rules for online reasoning) and the environment (e.g., pop-ups with information about 
the online source).
Choice architect Designer of choice environments; can be public or commercial. A public choice architect is a 
policy maker who uses insights from behavioral science and other sources to alter people’s 
choice environments to achieve behavioral change. Benevolent public choice architects do not 
act with the goal of maximizing revenue (unlike most commercial choice architects) but rather 
with the goal of maximizing individual and collective well-being.
Choice architecture Design of the external environments within which people make decisions (e.g., location of 
subway exits, presentation of foods in a cafeteria, display of search results for local restaurants 
on Google Maps, privacy settings on Facebook). Strategically organizing the external context in 
which people make decisions is one way to affect their choices.
Dark pattern Design of user interfaces employed to steer people’s choices toward unintended decisions in the 
service of commercial interests.
Data privacy Online, a set of rules for how Internet companies collect, share, and use personal information. 
An important aspect of data privacy concerns users’ choice to reveal or protect their personal 
information.
Internet A global system of interconnected computer networks that includes several applications—e.g., the 
Web, e-mail, messenger systems, and mobile applications—for communication between devices 
and for access to the information contained within these networks.
Nudge Behavioral intervention in the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way 
(e.g., default privacy settings). Educative nudges remind and prompt behavior (e.g., by providing 
additional useful information like fact-check labels).
Personalized or targeted 
advertising
A type of online advertising that shows ads to people on the basis of their online activity as well as 
both stated and inferred characteristics (e.g., gender, age, interests, political views, personality traits).
Recommender (also: 
Recommendation) system
Information-filtering and associations-finding algorithm that suggests products based on users’ past 
activities and preferences as well as the activities and preferences of other users with similar tastes.
Social web Web-based social networks and other collaborative platforms (e.g., forums). Advanced social web: 
global social-media websites (e.g., Facebook, Twitter).
Technocognition Cognitively inspired technological intervention in information architectures (e.g., introducing 
friction in the process of sharing offensive material).
Web (a.k.a. World Wide 
Web or www)
A standardized system for accessing and navigating information on the Internet; requires web 
browsers for access.
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friends who are considered to belong to the two closest 
circles (typically around five and 15, respectively) do not 
differ from the values for offline inner circles (Dunbar, 2016; 
Dunbar et al., 2015). This suggests that the cognitive and 
temporal constraints that “limit face-to-face networks are 
not fully circumvented by online environments” (Dunbar, 
2016, p. 7).
Amount of information, limitless space and stor-
age. Digital environments are not subject to the same 
constraints on information proliferation and storage 
found in physical surroundings. Online space is virtually 
limitless, contains several layers (e.g., surface Web and 
dark Web), and can grow at a high pace. Consider that 
when Sergey Brin and Larry Page launched Google in 
1998, they archived 25 million individual pages. In 2013 
that number had grown to 30 trillion and, by 2016, had 
reached more than 130 trillion (Schwartz, 2016). At the 
time of this writing in the second quarter of 2020, there 
were 1.8 billion websites on the Internet and approxi-
mately 4.5 billion Google searches a day.7 Moreover, the 
potential for speed and scope of information propagation 
is much higher online, where the same message can be 
effortlessly and immediately copied to reach vast audi-
ences. For example, the most shared tweet to date8 
reached 4.5 million retweets, most of which happened in 
the 24 hr after the initial posting. New technologies have 
systems made for processing and storing information 
superior to any previously available systems (Clowes, 
2013). This feature of digital technology also implies that 
information does not have an expiration date and can be 
stored more or less indefinitely—a situation that prompted 
the EU to establish what is commonly referred to as the 
“right to be forgotten,” which provides European citizens 
with a legal mechanism for ordering the removal of their 
personal data from online databases (European Parlia-
ment, 2016, Article 17).
Rapid change and adaptivity. Digital environments 
develop at a high rate, especially compared with most 
offline environments. The document-based Web 1.0 was 
replaced by the more interactive Web 2.0 in the begin-
ning of the 2000s, and an increasingly more sophisticated 
and AI-powered Web of data is being introduced (Aghaei 
et al., 2012; Fuchs et al., 2010). Online content can be 
added, removed, or changed in seconds, and digital 
architectures can rapidly adapt to new demands and 
challenges. Even small changes in the structure of online 
architectures can have major societal consequences: For 
example, introducing some friction into the process of 
sharing information (i.e., increasing the investment in 
time, effort, or money required to access or spread infor-
mation) can significantly decrease the likelihood of citi-
zens engaging with the affected sources, as the Chinese 
government’s attempt to manage and censor information 
shows (see Roberts, 2018). Clicks, likes, and other types 
of social information shared online—as insignificant as 
they may seem individually—can collectively amount to 
sizable changes (e.g., for election results, which can in 
some cases be decided by just a few votes). For example, 
in a large-scale experiment on their users’ newsfeeds, 
Facebook showed that including social information in an 
“I voted” button (in this case, displaying faces of friends 
who had clicked on the button) affected both click rates 
and real-world voting—people who saw social informa-
tion were 2.08% more likely to click on the button com-
pared with those who saw nonsocial information, and 
they were 0.39% more likely to vote than were people 
who saw an informational message or no message at 
all—suggesting that social signals from friends on social 
networks (especially close friends) contributed to the 
overall effect of the message on people’s voting behavior 
(Bond et al., 2012).
Intelligence, personalization, and datafication. 
The latest developments in the evolution of the Internet 
increasingly depend on datafication (the transformation 
of many aspects of the world and people’s lives into 
data9) and mediation of content by algorithms and other 
intelligent technologies (we expand on this in the AI-
Assisted Information Architectures section). Increasing 
datafication leads to increasing surveillance and control 
over people’s information diets (Zuboff, 2019), and rap-
idly developing machine-intelligence technology spurs a 
gradual relinquishing of both public control and trans-
parency surrounding the technology. For example, search 
Table 2. Characteristics of Online Environments
Structure and functionality Perception and behavior
Group sizes Social cues and communication
Amount of information, limitless space and storage Reliability of information and cues for epistemic quality
Rapid change and adaptivity Social calibration
Intelligence, personalization, and datafication Self-disclosure and privacy behavior
Choice architectures and the power of design Norms of civility
 Perception of reality
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engines and recommender systems (e.g., video sugges-
tions on YouTube) routinely rely on machine-learning 
systems that outperform humans in many respects (e.g., 
RankBrain in Google). Such algorithms are both complex 
and nontransparent—sometimes for designers and users 
alike (Burrell, 2016). The opacity of machine-learning 
algorithms stems from their autonomous and self-learning 
character: They are given input and produce output, but 
the exact processes that generate these outputs are hard 
to interpret. This has led some to describe these algo-
rithms as “black boxes” (Rahwan et  al., 2019; Voosen, 
2017). Modern-day online environments, unlike their 
offline counterparts, possess autonomous intelligence—
be it purely domain-specific machine intelligence, crowd-
sourced human intelligence, or a powerful combination 
of both.
Choice architectures and the power of design. Another 
feature that distinguishes online environments from 
physical surroundings is the ubiquity and the power of 
the design that mediates people’s online experience. The 
design of an interface in which people encounter the 
complexity of interconnected information online—the 
“human interface” (Berners-Lee et  al., 1992)—presup-
poses that it has a decisive role in how people perceive 
the information presented. In other words, there is no 
Internet without ubiquitous choice architectures (for a 
definition, see Table 1) that constrain, enable, and steer 
user behavior. The very nature of online platforms affords 
quick design of choice architecture: It might take years to 
make a city bike-friendly (e.g., by building new bike 
lanes), but adjusting default settings on online pages or 
introducing friction into the process of information shar-
ing can take less than a day. However, the same flexibility 
and adaptability of online choice architectures that can 
be used by benevolent choice architects to promote posi-
tive behavior can also be used by commercial and ill-
meaning actors (more on this in the Persuasive and 
Manipulative Choice Architectures section).
Differences in perception and behavior
Differences between online and offline environments 
are to be found not only in their structural characteris-
tics and functionality but also in people’s perception 
of them and the way their behavior might change online 
in light of these perceptions.
Social cues and communication. Online communi-
cation differs from face-to-face communication in several 
ways, including the potential for anonymity and asyn-
chronicity, the ability to broadcast to multiple audiences, 
and the availability of audience feedback (Misoch, 2015). 
Another characteristic of online communication that was 
emphasized in early research into Internet communica-
tion concerns the lack of nonverbal or physical cues—such 
as body language or vocal expressivity—that are important 
for conveying and understanding emotion in face-to-face 
communication. This raised concerns that increased use of 
computer-mediated communication would lead to impov-
erished social interaction (the reduced-social-cues model; 
e.g., Kiesler et al., 1984). However, it has now been rec-
ognized that users adapt to the medium and substitute 
the lack of nonverbal cues in digital communication with 
other verbal cues, thereby achieving equal levels of affec-
tive content (Walther et al., 2005, 2015). Online environ-
ments also contribute to the development of social cues, 
offering additional nonverbal cues such as emoticons, 
“likes,” and shares to enrich online communication. How-
ever, social cues can mean different things to users and 
platforms: To a user, a “like” button signifies appreciation 
or attention; to a tech firm, it is a useful data point. In 
addition, digital social cues can leak more information—
and more sensitive information—than people intend to 
share (e.g., sexual orientation, personality traits, political 
views), including information that can be exploited to 
psychologically target and manipulate users (Kosinski 
et al., 2013; Matz et al., 2017).
Reliability of information and cues for epistemic 
quality. Information available online often lacks not 
only the typical social cues found in face-to-face interac-
tion but also the cues to its epistemic quality that are 
generally available offline, such as an indication of 
sources or authorship. One reason for this is that the 
Internet—“an environment of information abundance”—
is no longer subject to traditional filtering through profes-
sional gatekeepers (Metzger & Flanagin, 2015, p. 447). 
Modern-day digital media replaces expert gatekeeping 
with either crowdsourced gatekeeping (e.g., Wikipedia) 
or automated gatekeeping (e.g., algorithms on social 
media; Tufekci, 2015). Although some online platforms 
deliberately construct information ecosystems that favor 
indicators of quality (e.g., references to sources, fact-
checking) and have rules for content creation (e.g., Logan 
et al., 2010), much of the content shared on social net-
works and online blogs does not give users sufficient 
cues to judge its reliability. Allcott and Gentzkow (2017) 
pointed out that because of the low costs of producing 
content, information online can be relayed among users 
with no significant third party filtering, fact-checking, or 
editorial judgment. An individual user with no track record 
or reputation can in some cases reach as many readers as 
Fox News, CNN, or The New York Times (p. 211).
Moreover, social-media platforms contribute to the 
phenomenon of “snack news”—“a news format that 
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briefly addresses a news topic with no more than a 
headline, a short teaser, and a picture” (Schäfer, 2020, 
p. 1). Schäfer (2020) argued that frequent exposure to 
snack news can indirectly lead to the formation of 
strong convictions that are based on an illusory feeling 
of being informed. This phenomenon is not rare; an 
analysis by Bakshy et al. (2015) of 10.1 million Face-
book profiles showed that users follow the links of only 
7% of the news posts that appear in their news feeds. 
Moreover, manipulative use of certain cues—for 
instance, creating fake-news websites, impersonating 
well-known sources and social-media accounts, inflat-
ing emotional content (Crockett, 2017), or creating an 
illusion of consensus (Yousif et al., 2019)—can lead to 
dubious or outright false claims and ideas being 
disseminated.
Unreliable and intentionally fabricated false informa-
tion is not found only in the digital world. Deception 
such as lying or impersonation is common offline as 
well (e.g., Gerlach et al., 2019). But because of some 
of the structural features we have discussed here (e.g., 
group size), deceptive acts can reach a much larger 
audience online than in face-to-face interactions. Imper-
sonating an individual is easier when the important and 
hard-to-fake cues that are normally used to verify a 
person’s identity (e.g., voice, appearance, behavior) are 
not readily available. The perception (accurate or inac-
curate) that false information and deception is more 
prevalent in the online world may exact far-reaching 
consequences. For instance, Gächter and Schulz (2016) 
recently showed, using cross-societal experiments from 
23 countries, that the prevalence of rule violations 
across societies may impair individual intrinsic honesty, 
which is crucial for the functioning of a society.
Social calibration. The Internet can also affect social 
calibration—that is, perceptions about the prevalence of 
opinions in the general population. Offline, one gathers 
information about how others think from the limited 
number of people with whom one interacts, and most of 
these people live nearby. In the online world, physical 
boundaries cease to matter; one can connect with people 
around the world. One consequence of this global con-
nectivity is that small minorities of people can form a 
seemingly large, if dispersed, community online. This in 
turn can create the illusion that even extreme opinions 
are widespread—thereby contributing to “majority illu-
sion” (Lerman et al., 2016) and “false consensus” effects 
(the perception of one’s views as relatively common and 
of opposite views as uncommon; Leviston et  al., 2013; 
Ross et al., 1977). Although one may find it very difficult 
to meet people in real life who believe the Earth is flat, 
the same is not true online among Facebook’s billions of 
users, where indeed there are some who do share this 
belief—or other equally exotic ones—and they can now 
find and connect with each other. Still another conse-
quence of global connectivity is that online social media 
“dramatically increase the amount of social information 
we receive and the rapidity with which we receive it, giv-
ing social effects an extra edge over other sources of 
knowledge” (O’Connor & Weatherall, 2019, p. 16).
Self-disclosure and privacy behavior. The emergence 
and development of new online environments has con-
sequences not only for how people communicate with 
others or how they evaluate information but also for the 
way they disclose information about themselves. Early 
studies on self-disclosure (revealing personal information 
to others) reported higher levels of sharing in visually 
anonymous computer-mediated communication than in 
face-to-face communication ( Joinson, 2001; Tidwell & 
Walther, 2002). People also tend to be more willing to 
disclose sensitive information in online surveys that have 
the reduced social presence of the surveyor ( Joinson, 
2007). A systematic literature review by Nguyen et  al. 
(2012) reported mixed evidence: Although most experi-
mental studies (four of six) that measured self-disclosure 
showed more disclosure in online than in face-to-face 
interactions, in survey studies, participants reported more 
disclosure and willingness to share information with their 
offline friends (six of nine surveys). One may speculate 
that although the level of closeness, trust, and depth of 
interactions may prompt people to disclose personal infor-
mation in offline relationships, the anonymity afforded by 
online communication can enhance people’s willingness 
to share. The benefits of online anonymity include the 
elimination of hierarchical markers (e.g., gender and eth-
nicity) that may trigger hostility (Young, 2002) and a 
sense of control people have over the information they 
share that stems from a belief that it will not be linked to 
their real personas. However, this sense of control can 
backfire. For example, one study showed that increasing 
individuals’ perceived control over the release and access of 
private information can increase their willingness to dis-
close sensitive information (the control paradox; Brandimarte 
et al., 2013).
Another paradox in people’s privacy behavior online 
is the privacy paradox: On one hand, people claim to 
care a great deal about their online privacy, but on the 
other, they appear to show little concern for it in their 
actual behavior (e.g., Acquisti et  al., 2015; Norberg 
et al., 2007; for reviews, see Barth & De Jong, 2017; 
Kokolakis, 2017). However, a meta-analysis by Baruh 
et al. (2017) demonstrated that privacy concerns predict 
the extent to which individuals engage in privacy man-
agement (even though it does not eliminate the dis-
crepancy). To the extent that the discrepancy between 
concerns and behavior does exist, it is possible that it 
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reflects how people trade off immediate advantages of 
service use versus future risks toward their data privacy 
(which is one of possible explanations of the privacy 
paradox; see, e.g., Acquisti et  al., 2015; Barth & De 
Jong, 2017). Another likely reason for this discrepancy 
between what people say about online privacy and 
what they actually do is the lack of transparency and 
associated lack of understanding of how online plat-
forms collect and use people’s data and what can be 
inferred from that data. For instance, according to a 
survey by the Pew Research Center, 74% of Americans 
did not know that Facebook maintained a list of their 
interests and traits (Hitlin & Rainie, 2019).
Norms of civility. The “online disinhibition effect” 
describes “a lowering of behavioral inhibitions in the 
online environment” (Lapidot-Lefler & Barak, 2012, p. 434) 
that is not seen offline. Online disinhibition can be both 
benign and toxic (Suler, 2004): It can inspire acts of gen-
erosity and help shy people socialize, but it can also lead 
to increased incivility in online conversations—as behav-
ior “that can range from aggressive commenting in threads, 
incensed discussion and rude critiques, to outrageous 
claims, hate speech, and more severe forms of harass-
ment such as purposeful embarrassment and physical 
threats” (Antoci et al., 2019, p. 84). One of the most com-
mon examples of incivility is trolling, a type of online 
harassment that involves “posting inflammatory malicious 
messages in online comment sections to deliberately pro-
voke, disrupt, and upset others” (Craker & March, 2016, 
p. 79). Trolling can be used strategically to disrupt the 
possibility of constructive conversation. Incivility is per-
vasive online: A survey by the Pew Research Center 
revealed that 44% of Americans have personally experi-
enced online harassment, and 66% have witnessed it 
being directed at others (Duggan, 2017). Although inci-
vility in online comments can polarize how people per-
ceive issues in the media (A. A. Anderson et al., 2014) 
and can disproportionally affect female politicians and 
public figures (Rheault et  al., 2019) and members of 
minority groups (Gardiner, 2018), it seems to be per-
ceived as the norm, rather than the exception, for online 
interaction (Antoci et al., 2019). One may speculate that 
actions in the online sphere might be perceived as less 
influential: For instance, insulting and even threatening 
anonymous users in online forums may be perceived as 
less harmful and consequential—for both the victim and 
the perpetrator—than threatening someone face to face.
Perception of reality. In contrast to the offline world, 
the Internet and social media are immaterial, virtual envi-
ronments that do not exist outside of the human-created 
technology that supports them (McFarland & Ployhart, 
2015). This relative lack of anchoring in the material 
world allows for multiple realities to be constructed for, 
or by, different audiences and media online (Waltzman, 
2017), so that any reference to the objective truth and shared 
reality can be replaced by alternative narratives (e.g., “sys-
temic lies” created to promote a hidden agenda; McCright & 
Dunlap, 2017). The impact of the Internet on the media 
landscape—along with several other factors, such as rising 
economic inequality and growing polarization—is likely to 
have contributed to the emergence of the “posttruth” 
environment, an alternative epistemic space “that has 
abandoned conventional criteria of evidence, internal 
consistency, and fact-seeking” (Lewandowsky, Ecker, & 
Cook, 2017, p. 360). In this alternative posttruth reality, 
deliberate falsehoods can be described as “alternative 
facts,” and politicians and media figures (on both sides of 
the Atlantic) can claim that objectivity “is a myth that is 
proposed and imposed on us” (Dmitry Kiselev, as quoted 
by Yaffa, 2014, para. 8), that “there’s no such thing, unfor-
tunately, anymore as facts” (Scottie Nell Hughes, as 
quoted by Holmes, 2016, para. 3), or that “truth isn’t 
truth” (Rudy Giuliani, as quoted by Pilkington, 2018, 
para. 2; see also Lewandowsky, 2020b; Lewandowsky & 
Lynam, 2018). These environments are conducive to the 
dissemination of false news and rumors, which in turn 
undermine public trust in any information and erode the 
basis of shared reality (Watts & Rothschild, 2017), thereby 
creating an atmosphere of doubt that serves as a fertile 
ground for conspiracy theories (more on this in the False 
and Misleading Information section).
To summarize, online and offline worlds differ in 
psychologically and functionally relevant ways. The 
online world appears to trigger perceptions that can 
render it different from the offline world. When people 
and online architectures are brought into contact (with-
out much public oversight and democratic governance), 
pressure points will emerge. We next review four such 
challenges (outlined in Fig. 2): persuasive and manipu-
lative choice architectures, AI-assisted information 
architectures, the proliferation of false and misleading 
information, and distracting environments.
Challenges in Online Environments
Persuasive and manipulative choice 
architectures
Modern online environments are replete with smart, 
persuasive choice architectures that are designed pri-
marily to maximize financial return for the platforms, 
capture and sustain users’ attention, monetize user data, 
and predict and influence future behavior (Zuboff, 
2019). For example, Facebook’s business model relies 
on exploiting user data to the benefit of advertisers; 
the goal is to maximize the likelihood that an ad 
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captures its target’s attention. To stretch the time people 
spend on the platform (thus producing behavioral data 
and watching ads), Facebook employs a variety of 
design techniques that aim to change users’ attitudes 
and behavior via persuasive choice and information 
architectures (e.g., Eyal, 2014; Fogg, 2003). It is no 
coincidence that notifications are red; the color incites 
a sense of urgency. The “like” button triggers a quick 
sense of social affirmation. The bottomless news feed, 
with no structural stop to scrolling (i.e., infinite scroll), 
prompts people to consume more without noticing. 
These examples illustrate that a witting or unwitting 
awareness (via massive A/B testing) of human psychol-
ogy underlies persuasive choice architectures and com-
mercial nudging. Benefiting from an abundance of data 
on human behavior, these architectures are continu-
ously being adapted to offer ever-more-appealing user 
interfaces to compete for human attention (e.g., Harris, 
2016).
The main ethical ambiguity of persuasive choice 
architectures and commercial nudging resides in their 
close ties to other types of influence, such as coercion 
and, in particular, manipulation. Coercion is a type of 
influence that does not convince its targets but rather 
compels them by eliminating all options except for one 
(e.g., take-it-or-leave-it choices). Manipulation is a hid-
den influence that attempts to interfere with people’s 
decision-making processes to steer them toward the 
manipulator’s ends. It neither persuades people nor 
deprives them of their options; instead, it exploits their 
vulnerabilities and cognitive shortcomings (Susser 
et al., 2019). Manipulation thus undermines both peo-
ple’s control and their autonomy over their decisions—
that is, their sense of authorship and their ability to 
identify with the motives of their choices (e.g., Dwor-
kin, 1988). It also prevents people from choosing their 
own goals and pursuing their own interests. Not all 
persuasive choice architectures are manipulative—only 
those that exploit people’s vulnerabilities in a nontrans-
parent, covert manner. Below we consider two cases 
in which persuasive design in online environments bor-
ders on manipulation: dark patterns and hidden privacy 
defaults.
Dark patterns—a term coined by designer and user-
experience researcher Harry Brignull (see Brignull, 
2019; Gray et  al., 2018; Mathur et  al., 2019)—are a 
Digital Challenges
Persuasive and Manipulative Choice Architectures AI-Assisted Information Architectures
False and Misleading Information Distracting Environments
Challenge to attention and 
cognitive control
Challenge to reasoning, 
discernment of truth, and 
civility of the public conversation
Challenge to decision autonomy 
and informed choice 
Challenge to decision autonomy and 
control over information environment
AI-powered algorithmic tools that filter and 
mediate information online (e.g., targeted 
advertising, personalized recommender 
systems, algorithmic filtering in search 
engines, personalized curation of news feeds 
on social media).
Online content (e.g., news items, videos, 
posts) that is not based on factual knowledge 
or evidence and that misleads the public by 
instilling inaccurate beliefs and/or 
undermining trust in the media. 
Digital environments optimized to monopolize 
and commodify human attention and online 
behaviors.
Strategic design of online environments and 
user interfaces that aims to affect people’s 
choices and steer their online behavior in the 
service of commercial interests (e.g., “dark 
patterns,” default settings that intrude on 
privacy).
Fig. 2. Challenges in the digital world.
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manipulative and ethically questionable use of persua-
sive online architectures. “Dark patterns are user inter-
face design choices that benefit an online service by 
coercing, steering, or deceiving users into making unin-
tended and potentially harmful decisions” (Mathur 
et al., 2019, p. 1). One notorious example of dark pat-
terns is the “roach motel,” unglamorously named after 
devices used to trap cockroaches. The roach motel 
makes it easy for users to get into a certain situation, 
but difficult to get out (in Fig. 3 it falls under the type 
“hard to cancel”). Many online subscription services 
function that way. For instance, creating an Amazon 
account requires just a few clicks, but deleting it is dif-
ficult and time consuming: The user must first hunt for 
the hidden option of deleting an account, then request 
this procedure by writing to customer service. This 
asymmetry in the ease of getting in and out borders on 
manipulation and retains customers. Another example 
is “forced continuity”: subscriptions that, after an initial 
free trial period, continue on a paid basis without noti-
fying users in advance and without giving them an easy 
way to cancel the service.10
Dark patterns are anything but rare. In a recent large-
scale study, Mathur et al. (2019) tested automated tech-
niques that identified dark patterns on a sizeable set of 
websites. They discovered 1,818 instances of dark pat-
terns from 1,254 websites in the data set of 11,000 
shopping websites. Mathur et al.’s findings revealed 15 
types of dark patterns belonging to seven broader cat-
egories (see Fig. 3), such as misdirection, applying 
social pressure, sneaking items into the user’s shopping 
basket, and inciting a sense of urgency or scarcity (a 
strategy often used by hotel-booking sites or airline 
companies).
Another case of persuasive design that borders on 
manipulation is hidden default settings. Hidden defaults 
present a particularly strong challenge because they 
trick people into accepting settings without being fully 
(if at all) aware of the consequences. For example, 
online platforms are often designed to make it difficult 
to discontinue personalized advertising or choose 
privacy-friendly settings. Default settings can also lead 
users to unwittingly share sensitive data, including loca-
tion information that can be used to infer attributes 
such as income or ethnicity (see, e.g., Lapowsky, 2019). 
Default data-privacy settings do not even have to follow 
dark-patterns strategies: Most users, lacking the time or 
motivation to go several clicks deep into the settings 
labyrinth, will not change their defaults unless they 
have a specific reason to do so. Hidden defaults raise 
clear ethical concerns, but these practices continue 
despite the introduction of the GDPR in Europe in 2016, 
which stresses the importance of privacy-respecting 
defaults and insists on a high level of data protection 
that does not require users to actively opt out of the 
collection and processing of their personal data (Euro-
pean Parliament, 2016, Article 25).
However, attempts to game the rules of informed 
consent and privacy by default have found to be a 
major challenge to GDPR implementation. Nouwens 
et  al. (2020) reported that dark patterns and hidden 
defaults in the form of implied consent are ubiquitous 
on new consent-management platforms (in the United 
Kingdom) and that only 11.8% meet minimal require-
ments of GDPR for valid consent (e.g., no prechecked 
boxes, explicit consent, rejecting as easy as accepting). 
According to a report by the Norwegian Consumer 
Council (2018), tech companies such as Google, Face-
book, and—to a lesser extent—Microsoft use design 
choices in “arguably an unethical attempt to push con-
sumers toward choices that benefit the service pro-
vider” (p. 4). On the topic of privacy, key findings of 
the report include the use of privacy-intrusive default 
settings (e.g., Google requires that the user actively go 
to the privacy dashboard to disable personalized adver-
tising), framing and wording that nudges users toward 
a choice by presenting the alternative as ethically ques-
tionable or highly risky (e.g., on Facebook: “If you keep 
face recognition turned off, we won’t be able to use 
this technology if a stranger uses your photo to imper-
sonate you”), giving users the illusion of control (e.g., 
Facebook allows users to control whether Facebook 
uses data from partners to show them ads, but not 
whether the data are collected and shared in the first 
place), take-it-or-leave-it choices (e.g., a choice between 
accepting the privacy terms or deleting an account), 
and design of choice architectures in which choosing 
the privacy-friendly option requires more effort from 
the users (Norwegian Consumer Council, 2018). Such 
design choices might also contribute to the privacy 
paradox by actively discouraging users from behaving 
in a way that reflects their concern for their privacy. 
Users’ halfhearted privacy-protecting behavior might 
be due not to laziness or a lack of skills but rather to 
the unnecessarily complicated nature of protecting 
one’s privacy online.
In sum, persuasive designs and commercial nudges 
can go far beyond transparent persuasion and enter the 
territory of hidden manipulation when they rely on dark 
patterns (Mathur et  al., 2019), default settings that 
intrude on user privacy (Norwegian Consumer Council, 
2018), and the exploitation of people’s biases and vul-
nerabilities (Susser et al., 2019). These practices affect 
not only how users access information but also what 
information they agree to share. Moreover, online 
manipulation undermines people’s control and auton-
omy over their decisions by nudging them toward 
behaviors that benefit commercial actors or by hiding 
relevant information (e.g., settings for discontinuing 
personalized advertisement).
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Category Type
Sneaking 
Attempting to misrepresent 
user actions or delay 
information that, if made 
available to users, they 
would likely object to.
Sneak Into Basket 
Adding additional products to users’ shopping carts 
without their consent.
Hidden Costs 
Revealing previously undisclosed charges to users right 
before they make a purchase.
Hidden Subscription 
Charging users a recurring fee under the pretense of a 
one-time fee or a free trial.
Urgency 
Imposing a deadline on a 




Indicating to users that a deal or discount will expire 
using a countdown timer.
Limited-Time Message
Indicating to users that a deal or sale will expire soon 
without specifying a deadline, thus creating uncertainty.
Misdirection
Using visuals, language, or 
emotion to steer users 
toward or away from 
making a particular choice.
Confirm Shaming
Using language and emotion (shame) to steer users 
away from making a certain choice.
Visual Interference
Using style and visual presentation to steer users to or 
away from certain choices.
Trick Questions
Using confusing language to steer users into making 
certain choices.
Pressured Selling
Preselecting more expensive variations of a product or 
pressuring the user to accept the more expensive 
variations of a product and related products.
Social Proof
Influencing users’ behavior 
by describing the 
experiences and behavior of 
other users.
Activity Messages
Informing the user about the activity on the website 
(e.g., purchases, views, visits)
Testimonials of uncertain origin
Testimonials on a product page whose origin is unclear.
Scarcity
Signaling that a product is 
likely to become 
unavailable, thereby 
increasing its desirability to 
users.
Low-Stock Message
Indicating to users that limited quantities of a product 
are available, increasing its desirability.
High-Demand Message
Indicating to users that a product is in high demand and 
likely to sell out soon, thereby increasing its desirability.
Obstruction
Making it easy for users to 
get into a situation but hard 
to get out of it.
Hard To Cancel
Making it easy for users to sign up for a recurring 
subscription but requiring e-mail or call for cancellation.
Forced Action
Forcing users to do 
something tangential to 
complete their task.
Forced Enrollment
Coercing users to create accounts or share their 
information to complete their tasks.
Fig. 3. Categories and types of dark patterns. Source and visual materials: Dark Patterns Project at Princeton 
University (https://webtransparency.cs.princeton.edu/dark-patterns); see also Mathur et al. (2019). The icons are 
used with permission of the Dark Patterns Project.
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AI-assisted information architectures
Another challenge of online information and choice 
architectures comes with the use of machine learning 
and smart algorithms. We use the term AI-assisted infor-
mation architectures to describe a variety of AI-powered 
algorithmic tools that filter and mediate information 
online. These tools include personalized targeted adver-
tising, personalized recommender systems, algorithmic 
filtering in search engines, and customized news feeds 
on social media (for an overview, see Fig. 4). Algorith-
mic filtering and personalization are not inherently 
malicious technologies—on the contrary, they are help-
ful tools that allow people to navigate the overwhelm-
ing amount of information on the Internet. Instead of 
showing countless random results for search queries, 
search engines aim to offer the most relevant results. 
For a user in Sydney, Australia, Googling “Newcastle” 
should prioritize information about the city that is 200 
km to the north, not its distant British namesake. In a 
similar vein, news feeds on social media strive to show 
news that is interesting to users. Recommender systems 
offer content suggestions on the basis of users’ past 
preferences and the preferences of users who are 
inferred to have similar tastes (e.g., video suggestions 
on Netflix and YouTube). Besides selecting information 
on the basis of its personalized relevance, algorithms 
can also filter out information that is considered to be 
harmful or unwanted, for instance by automatically fil-
tering spam or removing hate speech and disturbing 
videos (the majority of hate speech on Facebook is 
removed by its machine-learning algorithms; see Chart 
1 in “Social media’s struggle with self-censorship,” 
2020). There are countless examples of why filtering 
information on the Internet is indispensable and helpful 
and why automation makes this daunting process more 
efficient (e.g., Rainie & Anderson, 2017), and there are 
many ways in which algorithms can support human 
decision-making (Christian & Griffiths, 2016). Automated 
algorithmic systems act as buffers between the abun-
dance of information and the scarcity of human attention. 
However, they are not without some notable problems.
One general problem is that decision-making is 
being delegated to a variety of algorithmic tools without 
clear oversight, regulation, or understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the resulting decisions. For 
example, ranking algorithms and recommender systems 
are considered proprietary information, and therefore 
neither individual users nor society in general has a 
clear understanding of why information in search 
engines or social-media feeds is ordered in a particular 
way (Pasquale, 2015). Other factors contribute further 
to the lack of transparency,11 such as the inherent opac-
ity of machine-learning algorithms (the black-box prob-
lem) and the complexity of algorithmic decision-making 
processes (de Laat, 2018; Turilli & Floridi, 2009). Del-
egating decision-making this way not only results in 
impenetrable algorithmic decision-making processes 
but also precipitates people’s gradual loss of control 
over their personal information and a related decline 
in human agency and autonomy ( J. Anderson & Rainie, 
2018; Mittelstadt et al., 2016; Zarsky, 2016). Relatedly, 
data privacy and its protection in the context of AI-
assisted information environments should be seen not 
merely as an individual good but as a public good 
(Fairfield & Engel, 2015). As algorithmic inferences from 
data collected from users can be used to predict per-
sonal information of nonusers (known as shadow pro-
files; see Garcia, 2017), privacy may be at risk not 
because of an individual’s own actions but because 
others have been unconcerned about the privacy of 
their data or because online choice architectures have 
“nudged” others toward privacy-unfriendly options 
(e.g., Utz et al., 2019).
Consistent delegation of choice and shifting auton-
omy from users to algorithms leaves open the question 
of responsibility and accountability (Diakopoulos, 
2015). Because artificial agents are capable of making 
their own decisions and because no one has decisive 
control over their actions, it is difficult to assign respon-
sibility for the outcomes (e.g., the responsibility gap; 
see Matthias, 2004). Consider the decisions of a recom-
mender system employed on YouTube (boasting about 
2 billion users, it is the second most popular social 
network and the second most visited website world-
wide12). The recommender algorithm—based on deep 
neural-network architecture—offers video recommen-
dations to YouTube users with the predominant pur-
pose of increasing watching time (Covington, Adams, 
& Sargin, 2016). However, one unintended consequence 
happened to be that the system promoted videos that 
tended to radicalize their viewers with every step. For 
example, Tufekci (2018) reported how after showing 
videos of Donald Trump during the 2016 presidential 
campaign, YouTube started to recommend and autoplay 
videos featuring White supremacists and Holocaust 
denialists. After playing videos of Bernie Sanders, You-
Tube suggested videos on left-wing conspiracies (e.g., 
that the U.S. government was behind the 9/11 attacks). 
An investigation by The Guardian in cooperation with 
the former Google engineer Guillaume Chaslot dem-
onstrated the biased nature of YouTube recommenda-
tions and stated that it “systematically amplifies videos 
that are divisive, sensational and conspiratorial” (Lewis, 
2018, para. 25; see also Lewis & McCormick, 2018). 
There is now evidence suggesting that these algorithms 
may have actively contributed to the rise and unification 
of right-wing extremists in the United States (Kaiser & 
Rauchfleisch, 2018), Germany (Rauchfleisch & Kaiser, 
2017), and Brazil (Fisher & Taub, 2019). It is unlikely 
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that these are the only affected countries or that You-
Tube is the only platform with this problem. For 
instance, Facebook recommendation tools (“Groups 
you should join” and “Discover” algorithms), according 
to the company’s own internal report, have been 
implicated in the growth of extremists groups on the 
platform (see Horwitz & Seetharaman, 2020).
Who, then, should be held accountable for decisions 
made by autonomous recommender systems that sug-
gest ever more radical content on social networks: the 
CURATION
• Software agents designed to converse with 
human users (e.g., in customer support).
• Software agents performing tasks based on 
commands by human users (e.g., Siri, Amazon 
Alexa, Google Assistant).
Translation and Speech Recognition Filtering Algorithms
• E-mail filters for separating mail into categories 
(e.g., spam, promotions, social, primary.
• Child-protection filter.
Maps and Navigation
Content Moderation Facial Recognition
• Software agents designed to behave like 
human users (e.g., to post comments or 
share posts on social media).
Fraud Detection
Al-Assisted Information Architectures Online
Algorithmic Curation and Personalization






Virtual Assistants Social-Media Bots
Chatbots
• Machine-learning-based translation ser-
vices (e.g., Google Translate, DeepL). 
• Voice-to-text speech recognition.
• Search results (e.g., Google 
Search, Google Maps).
• Predictive searches (e.g., 
Google’s personalized search 
suggestions).




• Auctions for purchasing 
automated ad space (e.g., 
Google AdSense, Facebook 
Ads).
• Customization and 
targeting of ads to specific 
audiences (e.g., Facebook, 
Twitter).
• Algorithmic pricing, or 
competitive pricing 
suggestions in e-commerce 
(e.g., Amazon Marketplace).
• Recommendations for 
media items and products 
(e.g., Netflix, YouTube, 
Spotify, Amazon).
• Friends and accounts to 
follow (e.g., Facebook, 
Twitter, LinkedIn).
• Potential matches in online
dating (e.g., Tinder, OKCupid). 
• Identifying people in digital images (e.g., 
tag suggestions and image identification on 
Facebook).
• Face ID (e.g., on iPhone).
• Directions and orientation on maps (e.g., 
Google Maps, Apple Maps, HERE Technolo-
gies).
• Detection and automatic removal of harm-
ful content (e.g., fake accounts, hate speech, 
offensive graphic content, disinformation, 
inauthentic behavior).
• Fraud prevention in online banking and 
credit card transactions.
Fig. 4. Examples of AI-assisted information architectures online. Icons are used under license from Adobe Stock.
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developers of the algorithms, the owners of the plat-
forms, or the content creators? YouTube recently vowed 
to limit recommending conspiracy theories on its plat-
form (Wong & Levin, 2019), a move that highlights the 
tech industry’s unilateral power to shape their users’ 
information diets. In a recent empirical audit of You-
Tube recommendations, Hussein, Juneja, and Mitra 
(2020) found that the YouTube approach indeed limited 
recommendations of selected conspiracy theories (e.g., 
the flat-earth narrative) or medical misinformation (videos 
promoting vaccine hesitancy), but not of other misinfor-
mation topics (e.g., the chemtrail conspiracy narrative).
Another closely related concern is the impact of AI-
driven algorithms on choice architectures—for instance, 
when algorithms function as gatekeepers, deciding 
what information should be presented and in what 
order (Tufekci, 2015). Be it personalized advertising or 
filtering information to present the most relevant items, 
the results directly affect people’s choices by narrowing 
their options (Newell & Marabelli, 2015) and steering 
their decisions in a particular direction or reinforcing 
existing attitudes (e.g., Le et  al., 2019). The conse-
quences loom large for societies as a whole as well as 
for individuals: Epstein and Robertson (2015) showed, 
using a simulated search engine, that rankings favoring 
a particular political candidate can shift voting prefer-
ences of undecided voters by 20% or more. Given that 
four of the past five U.S. presidential elections resulted 
in margins between the Democrats and Republican of 
below 4% and that the 2016 election, for instance, was 
decided by razor-thin margins in a few swing states (six 
states were won by margins of less than 2%), the impact 
of potential search-engine biases should not be ignored.
Microtargeted advertisement on social media, espe-
cially in the context of political campaigning, is another 
case in point. This method relies on automated target-
ing of messages on the basis of people’s personal char-
acteristics (as extracted from their digital footprints) 
and a use of private information that stretches the 
notion of informed consent (e.g., psychographic profil-
ing; see Matz et al., 2017). The resulting microtargeted 
political messages, which are seen only by the targeted 
audience, can exploit people’s psychological vulnera-
bilities while evading public oversight. Findings show 
that data collected about people online can be used to 
make surprisingly accurate inferences about people’s 
sexual orientation, personality traits, and political views 
(Kosinski et al., 2013). For instance, algorithmic judg-
ments about people’s personalities that are based on 
information extracted from digital fingerprints (e.g., 
Facebook likes) can be more accurate than judgments 
made by relatives and friends (Youyou et al., 2015), and 
just 300 likes are sufficient for an algorithm to predict 
users’ personalities more accurately than their own 
spouses can (Youyou et  al., 2015). In a systematic 
review of 327 articles, Hinds and Joinson (2018) showed 
that multiple pieces of demographic data could be reli-
ably inferred from people’s digital footprints, including 
ethnicity, occupation, and sexual orientation. Hinds and 
Joinson (2019) also demonstrated that computer-based 
predictions of personality traits (e.g., extraversion, neu-
roticism) from digital footprints are more accurate than 
human judges’ predictions. This information can be 
used to create a dangerous “personality panorama” 
(Boyd et  al., 2020) of people’s behavior online that, 
consequently, can be employed to persuade and manip-
ulate users; for example, advertising messages can be 
adjusted to match people’s introversion or extroversion 
score (Matz et al., 2017). A former employee reported 
that Cambridge Analytica used personality profiling 
during Donald Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign to 
target fear-based messages (e.g., “Keep the terrorists 
out! Secure our borders!”) to people who scored high 
on neuroticism (Amer & Noujaim, 2019).
The impact of this manipulation on the outcomes of 
the Brexit vote and the 2016 U.S. election is a major 
cause for concern and an argument for stricter regula-
tion of online platforms (e.g., Jamieson, 2018; Persily, 
2017; Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 
2019). Sixty-two percent of social-media users in the 
United States agree that it is not acceptable for social-
media platforms to use their data to deliver customized 
messages from political campaigns (Smith, 2018b). 
Recent surveys in Germany, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States (Ipsos MORI, 2020; Kozyreva et al., 
2020) also provide evidence that people consider per-
sonalization and targeting in political campaigning 
unacceptable. The impact of microtargeting is often 
exacerbated by the lack of transparency in political 
campaigning on social media: It is nearly impossible to 
trace how much has been spent on microtargeting and 
what content has been shown (e.g., Dommett & Power, 
2019).
Another challenging consequence of algorithmic fil-
tering is algorithmic bias (e.g., Bozdag, 2013; Corbett-
Davies et al., 2017; Fry, 2018). Here ethical concerns 
touch on both the generation of biases in data processing 
and the societal consequences—such as discrimination—
of implementing biased algorithmic decisions (Mittelstadt 
et al., 2016; Rahwan et al., 2019). One particularly dis-
turbing set of examples concerns deeply rooted gender 
or racial biases that can be picked up by data-processing 
algorithms. One study of personalized Google adver-
tisements demonstrated that setting the gender to 
female (rather than male) in simulated user accounts 
resulted in fewer ads related to high-paying jobs (Datta 
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et al., 2015). Another study found that online searches 
for “Black-identifying” names were more likely to be 
associated with advertisements suggestive of arrest 
records (e.g., “Looking for Latanya Sweeney? Check 
Latanya Sweeney’s arrests”; Sweeney, 2013, p. 3). Names 
such as Jill or Kristen did not elicit similar ads even 
when arrest records existed for people with those 
names. Striking examples of racial biases in algorithmic 
decision-making are not limited to online environ-
ments; they also have consequential effects offline, for 
instance in policing and health (e.g., Obermeyer et al., 
2019).
Algorithms are designed by human beings, and they 
rely on existing data generated by human beings. They 
are therefore likely not only to generate biases because 
of technical limitations but also to reinforce existing 
biases and beliefs (Bozdag, 2013), which in turn can 
deepen ideological divides and exacerbate political 
polarization. Along the same lines, it has been argued 
that personalized filtering on social-media platforms 
may be instrumental in creating “filter bubbles” (Pariser, 
2011) or “echo chambers” (Sunstein, 2017); echo cham-
bers are information environments “in which individu-
als are exposed only to information from like-minded 
individuals” (Bakshy et al., 2015, p. 1130), whereas filter 
bubbles refer to content selection “by algorithms 
according to a viewer’s previous behaviors” (p. 1130). 
Both echo chambers and filter bubbles tend to amplify 
the confirmation bias—a way to search for and interpret 
information that reinforces preexisting beliefs and 
increases political polarization (e.g., Bail et al., 2018) 
and radicalization. Not everyone agrees about the exis-
tence of filter bubbles, however; some researchers 
argue that news-audience fragmentation is less preva-
lent than is often assumed (Flaxman et al., 2016) or that 
face-to-face interaction is currently even more segre-
gated than online discourse (Gentzkow & Shapiro, 
2011). Bakshy et al. (2015) found that individual choices, 
not algorithms, limit exposure to attitude-challenging 
views among Facebook users. But because recom-
mender systems typically “learn” users’ preferences, 
psychological tendencies in information selectivity and 
algorithmic amplification of those tendencies are likely 
to reinforce one another.
From a psychological perspective, many factors 
could motivate online segregation and polarization, 
including confirmation bias, selective exposure to infor-
mation, and selective engagement with online content 
(e.g., Garrett & Stroud, 2014). Although exposure might 
be not as segregated as is commonly claimed, social-
media environments show signs of selective engage-
ment (in the form of likes, shares, and comments; see 
Schmidt et  al., 2017), leading to “highly segmented 
interaction with social media content” (Garrett, 2017, 
p. 371). The extent to which such selective exposure 
and engagement can distort people’s information diets 
and influence democratic processes is highly debated—
we return to this topic in the next section.
False and misleading information
Another challenge presented by online environments 
and social networks is the increasing speed and scope 
of false-information proliferation and its resulting threat 
to the rationality and civility of public discourse—and 
ultimately to the very functioning of democratic societ-
ies. In this section we explore three questions: (a) What 
is the extent of the “false news” problem? (b) What are 
useful taxonomies of false and misleading information? 
(c) What are the psychological mechanisms underlying 
receptivity to false content online? Before we proceed, 
let us briefly mention our terminological choices. We 
use the term disinformation to refer to false and mis-
leading information spread with malicious intent, and 
we use misinformation for cases when the intent is 
unknown or irrelevant (as in Wardle & Derakhshan, 
2017). We generally use the term false news (instead of 
fake news) to refer to inaccurate information presented 
as news. However, we make an exception when dis-
cussing results from scientific articles that use “fake 
news” to refer to, for instance, “false and misleading 
information masquerading as legitimate news” (Allen 
et al., 2020, para. 1). We address the limitations of the 
“fake news” terminology and other useful classifica-
tions, including mis- and disinformation, after discuss-
ing the scope of the problem (also in Fig. 5).
Scope of the problem. We begin our review of the chal-
lenge of false and misleading information with an exami-
nation of its scope. A recent report by Bradshaw and 
Howard (2019) showed that in the past 2 years alone, the 
number of countries with disinformation campaigns more 
than doubled (from 28 in 2017 to 70 in 2019), and that 
Facebook remains the main platform for those cam-
paigns. At least half of all Internet users rely on online 
and social media as their primary sources of news and 
information, including 36% who access Facebook for 
news (Newman et al., 2020). False and unverified claims 
online can therefore lead not only to false beliefs and 
misguided actions but also to an erosion of trust in the 
information ecosystem—ultimately threatening a soci-
ety’s ability to hold evidence-based conversations and 
reach a consensus. There is much concern that the spread 
of false news and rumors on Facebook and Twitter influ-
enced the U.S. presidential election and the Brexit refer-
endum in 2016 (see Digital, Culture, Media and Sport 
Committee, 2019; Persily, 2017). For instance, Allcott and 
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read and remembered at least one fake-news article dur-
ing the election period. They also compiled a database of 
fake-news articles that circulated in the 3 months before 
the 2016 election (115 pro-Trump and 41 pro-Clinton) 
and that, together, were shared 38 million times in the 
week leading up to the election. As Silverman’s (2016) 
analysis showed, in the 3 months before the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election, the most popular false-news stories 
were more widely shared on Facebook than the most 
popular mainstream news stories. The 20 top-performing 
false election stories from hoax sites and hyperpartisan 
blogs generated 8,711,000 shares, reactions, and com-
ments, whereas the 20 top-performing election stories 
from legitimate news websites generated 7,367,000 reac-
tions. A single false story about the Pope endorsing Don-
ald Trump was liked or shared on Facebook 960,000 
times.
Online disinformation and misleading claims can 
have deadly real-world consequences: The Pizzagate 
conspiracy theory, which alleged that Hillary Clinton 
and her top aides were running a child-trafficking ring 
out of a Washington pizzeria, was floated during the 
2016 presidential campaign on Reddit, Twitter, and 
fake-news websites. It led to repeated harassment of 
the restaurant’s employees and eventually prompted an 
armed 28-year-old man to open fire inside the pizzeria 
(Aisch, Huang, & Kang, 2016). On a broader—and even 
more disturbing—scale, the Myanmar military orches-
trated a propaganda campaign on Facebook that tar-
geted the country’s Muslim Rohingya minority group, 
inciting violence that forced 700,000 people to flee 
(Mozur, 2018). Encrypted messenger networks such as 
WhatsApp are also vulnerable to manipulation: False 
rumors about child kidnappers shared in Indian Whats-
App groups in 2018 incited at least 16 mob lynchings, 
leading to the deaths of 29 innocent people (Dixit & 
Mac, 2018). Most recently, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
given rise to multiple conspiracy theories and mislead-
ing news stories that gain credibility among members 
of the public by exploiting their fears and uncertainty; 
for instance, 29% of Americans believe that COVID-19 
was created in a lab (Schaeffer, 2020), and there have 
been up to 50 attacks on mobile-phone masts in the 
UK since the spread of coronavirus was fallaciously 
linked to the country’s rollout of the 5G mobile network 
(Adams, 2020).
Several recent analyses have suggested that the prob-
lem of fake news is not as serious as was initially 
believed in the aftermath of Brexit and the 2016 U.S. 
election (Allen et al., 2020; Grinberg et al., 2019; Guess 
et al., 2019; Guess, Lockett, et al., 2020; Guess, Nyhan, 
& Reifler, 2020). Table 3 summarizes these articles, 
which all used big-data analyses to measure Americans’ 
exposure to fake news and concluded that the limited 
prevalence of fake news online (of the type examined 
in these articles)13 may not present cause for alarm.
Although there is notable heterogeneity among the 
articles shown in Table 3, particularly in the source of 
data, the analyses identify at least three consistent attri-
butes of the problem of fake news: First, the distribu-
tion of fake-news consumption and sharing is extremely 
lopsided; most people are not involved at all, and a 
small number of users are responsible for the lion’s 
share of consumption and sharing. Second, age appears 
to be an important variable: People over the age of 65 
share far more fake news than do younger adults. 
Finally, the political distribution is highly asymmetrical. 
Although some fake news appeals to left-wing views, 
the majority of fake news is consonant with right-wing 
attitudes. Accordingly, people on the far right, and 
Trump supporters in particular, share considerably 
more fake news than do moderates or liberals.
The articles also share a methodological commonal-
ity that reveals a strong limitation: They all operational-
ize exposure to or sharing of fake news by counting 
visits to or shares of a limited number of specific web-
sites (Table 3, final column). Fake-news outlets were 
defined as sites that have the trappings of legitimately 
produced news but lack the editorial standards or pro-
cesses to ensure accuracy (Grinberg et al., 2019). Exam-
ples included conservativetribune.com, wnd.com, and 
rushlimbaugh.com. Lists of those sites were carefully 
curated by a variety of sources (Table 3, footnotes) and 
cross-checked against fact-checker performance (e.g., 
Guess, Nyhan, & Reifler, 2020). One can therefore state 
with confidence that those sites were purveyors of fake 
news. Most articles listed in Table 3 also showed that 
the authors’ conclusions were robust to extensions and 
alterations of their lists. Yet the articles did not consider 
any other forms of political material online as potential 
sources of fake news; false advertisements, unchecked 
false statements by politicians, and false or misleading 
information in mainstream media were not included in 
the analyses. Moreover, looking at click-through rates 
considerably underestimates exposure to false news 
because most people do not follow the link in the 
headlines that they see on their social-media feeds (see 
e.g., Bakshy et al., 2015).
The results in Table 3 therefore present a lower 
bound on exposure to false and misleading information 
online. Their converging suggestion that few people 
visit or share material from fake-news sites does not 
speak to the magnitude of the disinformation problem 
overall (as noted by Allen et al., 2020). Concern about 
the widespread effects of misinformation on society is 
therefore justified (e.g., Bradshaw & Howard, 2019; 
Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2018; Zerback et  al., 
2020). These legitimate concerns are fueled by a 
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Table 3. Summary of Recent Big-Data Analyses of Fake News Consumption in the United States







TV consumption and all online 
consumption (mobile and 
desktop). Also “imputed 
passive consumption” (items 
that appear in feed but were 
not clicked on by user) for 
top four sites (Facebook, 
YouTube, Twitter, Reddit) 
and top three search engines 
(Google, Bing, Yahoo).
•  TV consumption outweighs online 
consumption by factor of 5
•  Fake news constitutes only 0.15% of 
daily media diet
•  For a very small number (0.7% 
of panel), more fake news was 
consumed than real news
•  Older people are more exposed to 







Twitter feed (URLs only) from 
a sample (N = 16,442) of 
registered voters.
•  5% of political exposure on Twitter 
was fake news
•  Average proportion of fake news in an 
individual’s feed was 1.18%
•  1% of individuals accounted for 80% 
of fake news source exposures
•  0.1% accounted for nearly 80% of fake 
news sources shared
•  Far more exposure and sharing on 
right than left and by older people 
than by younger people







Web consumption of 
(demographically) 
representative online panel (N 
= 2,525), excluding Facebook 
news feed and mobiles.
•  5.9% of news articles during 2016 
election were from untrustworthy sites
•  44.3% of Americans visited 
untrustworthy sites
•  62% of traffic to untrustworthy 
websites came from the 20% of news 
consumers with the most conservative 
information diets
•  Older people also consumed more
•  Access to untrustworthy sites increased 
with Facebook usage





Facebook sharing data combined 
with online survey from a 
representative panel (N = 
1,191).
•  More than 90% shared no stories from 
fake-news domains
•  8.5% of respondents shared at least 
one fake-news article
•  Sharing vastly greater among 
conservatives and older people (people 
over 65 share 7 times as much as others)
•  Sharing of fake news not related to 
overall sharing quantity; not the case 








Survey (N = 18,733 across two 
waves, each in three parts—
summer, fall, and winter) with 
all web browsing data (limited 
access to mobile usage).
•  Fake-news consumption associated 
with low trust in media and greater 
affective polarization.
•  Fake news associated with greater belief 
in pro-Republican misperceptions (even 
after controlling for partisanship)
•  Fake news not associated with 
political participation
•  Additional experimental results not 
reported here
171 + 64 + 65b
aThe 98 URLs were truncated by traffic (eliminating low-traffic sites) from a full list of 642 sites formed by combining Grinberg et al. (2019)’s “red” 
and “black” sites with lists created by NewsGuard and Buzzfeed. bBuilding on previous research, a list was compiled of 171 “black” sites (almost 
exclusively fabricated), 64 “red” sites (flawed editorial process), and 65 “orange” sites (less likely to be systematically flawed). Additional black 
sites were curated but did not appear in the data. cThree hundred eighty-two “black” sites, 61 “red,” and 47 “orange” combined from Grinberg 
et al. (2019) and (Guess et al., 2019). dList of fake news sites curated by a journalist (Silverman at Buzzfeed), reduced to 21 sites.
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number of issues. For example, Facebook has an 
explicit policy against fact-checking political advertise-
ments (Wagner, 2020), which was—unsurprisingly—
exploited during the December 2019 election in the 
UK. According to fact-checkers, 88% of Facebook ads 
posted by the Conservative party during a sampling 
period immediately before the election were mislead-
ing, compared with around 7% of those posted by the 
Labour party (Reid & Dotto, 2019). In addition, even a 
small dose of fake news can set agendas in “its ability 
to ‘push’ or ‘drive’ the popularity of issues in the broader 
online media ecosystem” (Vargo et al., 2018, p. 2043). 
Vargo et al. (2018) showed that although fake news did 
not dominate the media landscape from 2014 through 
2016, it was intertwined with American partisan media 
(e.g., Fox News); each influenced the other’s agendas 
across a wide range of topics, including the economy, 
education, the environment, international relations, reli-
gion, taxes, and unemployment.14
Last but not least, people’s perceived exposure to 
misinformation and disinformation online is high:15 In 
the EU, “in every country, at least half of respondents 
[in the sample of 26,576] say they come across fake 
news at least once a week” (Directorate-General for 
Communication, 2018, p. 2). In the United States, “about 
nine-in-ten U.S adults (89%) say they often or some-
times come across made-up news intended to mislead 
the public, including 38% who do so often” (Mitchell 
et al., 2019, p. 15). Globally (across 40 countries), 56% 
of respondents are concerned about what is real or fake 
when it comes to online news, and almost four in 10 
(37%) said they had come across a lot or a great deal 
of misinformation about COVID-19 on social media, 
such as Facebook and Twitter (Newman et al., 2020).
Taxonomies of false and misleading information. 
What is online false and misleading information? Clearly, 
it is not a single homogeneous entity. For instance, dan-
gerously misleading online content might arise from delib-
erate attempts to manipulate public opinion or emerge as 
an unintended consequence of sharing unverified rumors 
and false news. Focusing on information falseness and 
the intent to mislead, Wardle and Derakhshan (2017) dis-
tinguished among three types of “information disorders”16: 
misinformation (false or misleading content created and 
initially shared without malicious intent), disinformation 
(false, fabricated, or manipulated content shared with 
intent to mislead or cause harm), and malinformation 
(genuine information shared with intent to cause harm—
e.g., hate speech and leaks of private information).
Although this classification establishes some useful 
general distinctions, the landscape of online falsehoods 
and propaganda is much more complicated. For example, 
the difference in intent between misinformation and dis-
information is often hard to establish, and the real con-
sequences of both can be equally harmful. Both are 
therefore usually considered to be false information—or, 
if presented as news, false (or fake) news. Moreover, there 
are additional categories of misleading content, such as 
online political propaganda and “systemic lies” (McCright 
& Dunlap, 2017); the latter are created and curated by 
organized groups with vested interests (e.g., fossil-fuel 
companies denying climate science). Likewise, motiva-
tions for creating false content can be financial as well as 
ideological: Recent findings by the Global Disinformation 
Index (2019) showed that online ad spending on disin-
formation domains amounted to $235 million a year.
Creating and disseminating false information relies 
on several common practices that can be catalogued 
and used to develop tools to counteract disinformation 
(e.g., inoculation; see Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 
2019, and the Inoculation: Boosting Cognitive Resil-
ience to Misinformation and Manipulation section). 
Figure 5 lists the main categories of false and mislead-
ing information in the digital sphere; Figure 6 lists the 
main sources and strategies used for its creation and 
dissemination. We have compiled these classifications 
from a wide range of sources (indicated in the figures). 
One likely reason for controversies in the literature on 
the impact and significance of false information is the 
use of narrow definitions of fake news that exclude 
many manipulative sources as well as half-truths and 
other misleading techniques. At the same time, the 
“type of misinformation on the margins” (Warzel, 2020, 
para. 33)—that is, “believable information [that] is inter-
spersed with unverifiable claims” (para. 37)—is the 
most difficult to trace, debunk, and verify. We have 
therefore chosen to include a variety of sources and 
types of false and misleading information instead of 
focusing on a narrow definition of fake news or a more 
abstract definition of “information disorders.”
Propaganda, rumors, conspiracy theories, and other 
kinds of misleading information are not novel phenom-
ena, nor are they exclusive to online environments (see 
Uberti, 2016): As early as 1275, England’s First Statute 
of Westminster (English Parliament, 1275) outlawed 
spreading false news, stating that “none shall report 
slanderous news, whereby discord may arise” (Chapter 
34). Numerous fake-news stories were published in 
newspapers in the 19th century, including the Great 
Moon hoax published in the New York tabloid The Sun 
in 1835. However, what distinguishes online pro-
paganda and misinformation is the new medium itself. 
Besides having the capacity to spread misinformation 
further and faster, online environments offer new 
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combination of algorithms and automation (e.g., bots) 
with human curation to flood social-media networks 
with misleading and polarizing content (Bradshaw & 
Howard, 2019; Woolley & Howard, 2017). The scope of 
false information and the speed with which it prolifer-
ates online is deeply connected to the nature and tech-
nical capabilities of online networks (Bounegru et al., 
2018). Yet to fully understand the dissemination dynam-
ics of false information, one must also consider how it 
hits specific hot buttons in people’s psychological 
make-up and who might be particularly susceptible to 
believing and sharing false news and rumors.
Psychology of fake news and receptivity to false 
information. Recent research has found that false 
news on Twitter spreads faster, deeper, and broader than 
does truth (Vosoughi et al., 2018).17 Fake news appears to 
press several psychological hot buttons. One is negative 
emotions and how people express them online. For 
instance, Vosoughi et al. (2018) found that false stories 
that “successfully” turned viral were likely to inspire fear, 
disgust, and surprise; true stories, in contrast, triggered 
anticipation, sadness, joy, and trust. The ability of false 
news to trigger negative emotions may give it an edge in 
the competition for human attention, and digital media 
may, as Crockett (2017) argued, promote the expression 
of negative emotions such as moral outrage “by inflating 
its triggering stimuli, reducing some of its costs and 
amplifying many of its personal benefits” (p. 769). More 
generally, people are more likely to share messages fea-
turing moral–emotional language (Brady et al., 2017). It 
is possible that this type of loaded language and content, 
which feeds on humans’ negativity bias (i.e., the human 
proclivity to attend more to negative than to positive 
things; Soroka et  al., 2019), succeeds in “attentional 
capture”—that is, it manages to shift cognitive resources 
to particular stimuli (Brady et al., 2019).18
Another hot button that fake news can press is the 
human attraction to novelty and surprise. Anything that 
is new, different, or unexpected is bound to catch a 
person’s eye. Indeed, neuroscientific studies suggest 
that stimulus novelty makes people more motivated to 
explore (e.g., Bunzeck & Düzel, 2006). Vosoughi et al. 
(2018) found that false stories were significantly more 
novel than true stories across various metrics. They also 
found that people noticed this novelty, as indicated by 
the fact that false stories inspired greater surprise (and 
greater disgust). One interpretation of these findings is 
that falsehood’s edge in the competition for limited 
attention is that it feeds on a highly adaptive human 
bias toward novelty.
Still another factor in the dissemination dynamics of 
false and misleading information is that the business 
models behind social media rely on immediate gratifica-
tion; deliberation and critical thinking slow users down, 
which is generally detrimental to a social-media orga-
nization’s internal goals. Recently, Pennycook and Rand 
(2019b) showed that insufficient analytic reasoning—
rather than politically motivated reasoning—is what 
appears to drive people’s belief in fake news.19 People 
might believe fake news because they are discouraged 
from taking the time to think critically about it—but 
their political leanings affect whether they share it: 
“Participants were only slightly more likely to consider 
sharing true headlines than false headlines, but much 
more likely to consider sharing politically concordant 
headlines than politically discordant headlines” 
(Pennycook et al., 2019, p. 3; see also Pennycook et al., 
2020). Deliberation and analytic reasoning thus seem 
to play a role in judging accuracy, but other factors 
contribute to sharing information, including one’s politi-
cal loyalty. Political partisanship has also been shown 
to be a significant factor in selective sharing of news 
(Weeks & Holbert, 2013) and fact-checking messages 
(Shin & Thorson, 2017). Moreover, ideologically moti-
vated reasoning has been shown to play a role in 
endorsement of conspiracy theories (Miller, Saunders, 
& Farhart, 2016, p. 837); U.S. conservatives are signifi-
cantly more likely than liberals to endorse specific con-
spiracy theories or to espouse conspiratorial worldviews 
in general (van der Linden et al., 2020).
A final factor in the dissemination dynamics of false 
information is which people are especially susceptible 
to it. Several recent studies have shown that increasing 
age is associated with increasing susceptibility to false 
information (see Table 3). A study of fake news on 
Facebook found that Americans over age 60 were much 
more likely to visit fake-news sites compared with 
younger people (Guess et al., 2019). Furthermore, the 
vast majority of both shares of and exposures to fake 
news on Facebook were attributable to relatively small 
fractions of the population, predominantly older adults 
(Grinberg et al., 2019). Allen et al. (2020) also found that 
false news was “more likely to be encountered on social 
media . . . and that older viewers were heavier consum-
ers than younger ones” (p. 4). Brashier and Schacter 
(2020) argued “that cognitive declines alone cannot 
explain older adults’ engagement with fake news” 
(p. 321), but that gaps in digital literacy and social motives 
may play a bigger role. The role of analytic reasoning 
and deliberation may also offer hints as to who is particu-
larly susceptible to false information. For instance, it is 
possible that users who rely more on reason than on 
emotions when making decisions may be less vulnerable 
to fake news; indeed, there is some evidence that is 
consistent with this possibility (Martel et al., 2020).
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Distracting environments
We now turn to a final challenge of online environ-
ments: the way they shape not only information search 
and decision-making but also people’s ability to concen-
trate and allocate their attention efficiently. As early as 
1971, Herbert Simon understood that in an information-
rich world, an abundance of information goes hand in 
hand with a scarcity of attention on the part of individu-
als and organizations: “A wealth of information creates 
a poverty of attention and a need to allocate that atten-
tion efficiently among the overabundance of informa-
tion sources that might consume it” (Simon, 1971, pp. 
40–41). Information overload and scarcity of attention 
became even more salient with the rapid evolution and 
proliferation of the Internet and media technologies. 
The original goals behind the Web were to create a user 
interface that would facilitate access to information and 
to simplify the process of information accumulation in 
the interconnected online space (Berners-Lee et  al., 
1992). Organizing information and making it accessible 
is also part of Google’s official mission statement 
(Google, 2020).
However, as new informational environments 
evolved and business models of Internet companies 
were refined, the goals and incentives of Internet design 
shifted as well. Human collective attention became a 
profitable market resource for which different actors 
compete. Fierce competition for human attention has 
led to the growing fragmentation of collective attention, 
with ever greater proliferation of novelty-driven content 
and shorter attention intervals allocated to particular 
topics (Lorenz-Spreen et  al., 2019). By analyzing the 
dynamics of collective attention that is spent on cultural 
items such as Twitter hashtags, Google queries, or Red-
dit comments, Lorenz-Spreen et al. (2019) showed that 
across the past decade, the rate at which the popularity 
of items decreased or increased has grown. For exam-
ple, in 2013, a hashtag on Twitter was popular on aver-
age for 17.5 hr; in 2016, its popularity lasted only 11.9 
hr. The authors’ explanation is that when an excess of 
information meets limited attentional capacities, peo-
ple’s thirst for novelty leads to accelerated ups and 
downs for each item and a higher frequency of alternat-
ing items. In other words, the amount of collective 
attention allocated to each single topic is decreasing 
and more topics are attended to in the same amount 
of time.
In the online world, the ability to concentrate 
becomes even more compromised when one’s sur-
roundings are full of distracting stimuli that, by buzzing, 
ringing, or flashing, constantly call for attention. More-
over, digital environments are no longer constrained to 
desktop screens but are becoming increasingly inte-
grated in people’s daily routines through a variety of 
smart devices. Unsurprisingly, these environments, 
which breed constant distraction and interruption, has 
led to “distracted minds” (Gazzaley & Rosen, 2016). 
Even the mere presence of a smartphone can occupy 
attentional resources and reduce cognitive ability (Ward 
et al., 2017), and smartphone notifications disrupt per-
formance on attention-demanding tasks even when 
people are not actively attending to their phone, argu-
ably because of mind wandering (Stothart, Mitchum, & 
Yehnert, 2015). In other words, when limited resources 
are shared between different sources competing for 
human attention (e.g., task-specific actions and task-
irrelevant thoughts), ability to concentrate on the task 
suffers and performance drops.
Likewise, media multitasking—simultaneously attend - 
ing to several media sources, such as TV, text messages, 
and websites—is becoming more and more common 
among not only younger people but also older people 
(C. Rosen, 2008). Studies of high school and university 
students showed that the typical student could not stay 
focused on a task for more than 3 to 5 min without 
checking their messages or browsing the Web (L. D. 
Rosen, Carrier, & Cheever, 2013); in addition, multitask-
ing is particularly pronounced when people read on a 
screen rather than in print (Carrier et al., 2015). A study 
by Ophir, Nass, and Wagner (2009) demonstrated that 
individuals who frequently multitask are more dis-
tracted by the multiple media they consume and have 
more difficulties in cognitive control over their atten-
tion; for instance, they show greater difficulty in filter-
ing out irrelevant stimuli from the environment or from 
their memory. A review of studies on multitasking 
shows that switching attention between tasks instead 
of concentrating on one specific task not only increases 
the time spent on a task but also negatively affects 
performance (Uncapher & Wagner, 2018).20
In the zero-sum race for finite human attention, mod-
ern Internet technologies are designed to be appealing, 
addictive, and distracting (see Harris, 2016). Take, for 
instance, Facebook, which provides users with many 
types of rewards, including positive feedback in the 
form of “likes” and shares, social reinforcements in mes-
sages and comments, and friend requests. As Meshi 
et  al. (2015) noted, “even minimalistic cues of social 
success such as these may activate our brain’s reward 
system, and keep us coming back to Facebook for 
more” (p. 774)—not unlike in Skinner’s operant-condi-
tioning experiments with rats and pigeons (“virtual 
Skinner boxes”; Davidow, 2013), but this time with 
humans as the subjects.
Indeed, some (e.g., Harris, 2016; Wu, 2016) have 
suggested that Internet companies may be using behav-
iorist research on operant conditioning and schedules 
of reinforcement (e.g., Ferster & Skinner, 1957) to 
reward and maintain distracted online behavior (e.g., 
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playing video games or checking updates on social 
media). Jonathan Badeen, cofounder of the online dat-
ing app Tinder, recently acknowledged that its algo-
rithms were inspired by this behaviorist approach 
(Reynolds, 2019). Reinforcements in those cases are 
messages, likes, matches, comments, or any desirable 
content that is delivered at irregular intervals and that 
prompts users to constantly refresh their feeds and 
check their inboxes. Furthermore, there is initial sug-
gestive evidence that people’s behaviors on social 
media are consistent with reward learning. Using four 
large social-media data sets,21 Lindström et al. (2019) 
demonstrated that reward learning theory can also 
model human behavior on social media, which, accord-
ing to the authors, “exhibited a signature pattern of 
reward learning, such that computational models 
inspired by RL theory, originally developed to explain 
the behavior of non-human animals, could quantita-
tively account for online behavior” (p. 22). By focusing 
on the timing of social-media posts, their analyses 
showed that “people dynamically adjust their social 
media behavior in response to their own social rewards, 
as predicted by reward learning theory” (p. 17). Neu-
roscientific research also suggests that receiving posi-
tive feedback on social media (e.g., in the form of 
“likes”) is associated with activity in the brain’s reward 
network (Sherman et al., 2016), especially in regions 
associated with reward processing and prosocial behav-
ior (Sherman et al., 2018).
According to the operant-conditioning approach, the 
strength of behavior depends not only on the reinforce-
ment, but also on the intervals or schedules at which 
rewards are delivered (Fig. 7). Although fixed schedules 
depend on rewards being delivered at predictable time 
intervals (fixed-interval schedules) or after a certain 
number of attempts (fixed-ratio schedules), in variable-
interval schedules, reinforcements are delivered at time 
intervals that are unpredictable from a subjective per-
spective (e.g., checking text messages that arrive at 
unpredictable times). Variable-ratio schedules involve 
reinforcement after an average (but not fixed) number 
of responses (e.g., winning a prize after a variable 
number of attempts). Slot machines and lottery games 
are typical examples of variable-ratio schedules that 
maintain behavior efficiently (e.g., Thorens et al., 2012), 
as is online gaming (Ducheneaut et al., 2006). Variable-
interval and variable-ratio schedules are both known 
to create a steady rate of responding; variable-ratio 
schedules produce the highest rates of response and 










Reinforcement is delivered at 
predictable time intervals (e.g., 
receiving a grade 1 week after
an exam). 
Reinforcement is delivered after 
a fixed number of responses 
(e.g., receiving a reward after 
pressing a button N times).
Reinforcement is delivered at 
unpredictable time intervals  
(e.g., messages, updates). 
Reinforcement is delivered after 
an unpredictable number of 
responses (e.g., slot machines).
FIXED-INTERVAL SCHEDULE FIXED-RATIO SCHEDULE
VARIABLE-RATIO SCHEDULEVARIABLE-INTERVAL SCHEDULE
RATIO
Fig. 7. Four classes of schedules of reinforcement. The operant-condition-
ing chamber (also known as the Skinner box) was used to study animal 
behavior by teaching an animal (e.g., a rat) to perform certain actions (e.g., 
pressing a lever) in response to a controlling stimulus (e.g., a light signal) 
reinforced by a reward (e.g., food). Different schedules of reinforcement 
were studied to see which would create steady and high rates of response 
behavior. By analogy, “virtual Skinner boxes,” such as social media or 
online gaming offer their users rewards (e.g., likes or reaching another 
level in a game) at varying intervals to reinforce and maintain the desired 
behavior. Icons are used under license from Adobe Stock.
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rates (Domjan, 2018, p. 119). It seems that if rewards 
are difficult to predict, people tend to increase the rate 
of a particular behavior, perhaps hoping to eventually 
attain the desired reward.
To summarize, we distinguished four groups of chal-
lenges to human cognition and motivation in online 
environments. Our list of challenges is not exhaustive. 
Our focus here has been on urgent challenges to peo-
ple’s agency, self-control, and autonomy of choice as 
well as to the civility and rationality of public discourse 
and ultimately the functioning of democratic societies. 
Many other issues raised by online environments and 
digital technology also deserve psychologists’ attention, 
such as the nature of the association between social-
media use and individual well-being. The four chal-
lenges we reviewed are as follows:
•• Human-made, ubiquitous, persuasive, and manipu-
lative designs, which rely on dark patterns and 
hidden defaults, challenge the human capacity to 
exercise autonomous and informed choice. These 
practices affect not only how people access infor-
mation but also—as is the case with privacy-intrud-
ing defaults—what information they agree to share.
•• AI-assisted information architectures that filter 
information on the Internet and shape personal-
ized information environments reduce agency 
and autonomy, amplify biases, and introduce 
obscurity into the automated decision-making 
processes.
•• False and misleading information disseminated 
through social networks and digital media can 
have wide-ranging and serious consequences in 
the offline world. False information comes in 
many forms, including but not limited to fake 
news. In the race for people’s limited attention, 
false information systematically presses psycho-
logical hot buttons (e.g., emotional content and 
novelty) and exploits people’s lack of delibera-
tion. Demographic factors, such as age, affect how 
receptive people may be to online falsehoods.
•• Internet technologies are designed to be highly 
appealing, addictive, and distracting. Possibly 
armed with solid empirical and theoretical knowl-
edge of operant conditioning, Internet companies 
compete in a zero-sum race for finite human 
attention. This has resulted in digital media that 
fosters distraction and attenuates people’s capac-
ity for concentration and self-control.
Behavioral Interventions Online: 
Nudging, Technocognition, and Boosting
Although challenges loom large, they are not insur-
mountable. Insights and evidence from psychological 
science point the way to potential remedies. In this 
section, we summarize three types of evidence-based 
behavioral and cognitive interventions that can be 
applied to the digital world: nudges, technocognition, 
and boosts (Fig. 8).
Behavioral and Cognitive Interventions Online
Nudging
BoostingTechnocognition
Hertwig and Grüne-Yanoff (2017)
Behavioral interventions in the choice architecture 
 that alter people’s behavior in a predictable way 
 (e.g., automatic [default] privacy-respecting settings). 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008)
Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook (2017)
Cognitive interventions and 
tools that aim to foster 
people’s cognitive and 
motivational competencies 
(e.g., simple rules for online reasoning).
Cognitively inspired 
technological interventions 
in information architectures 
(e.g., introducing friction in 
the sharing of offensive material).
Fig. 8. Types of behavioral and cognitive interventions for the digital world. The “nudging” icon is used under 
an Attribution 3.0 Unported (CC BY 3.0) license granted by Luis Prado at thenounproject.com. Other icons are 
used under license from Adobe Stock.
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Nudging
Nudging is a popular approach to behavioral policy 
that harnesses the power of choice environments and 
the knowledge of human psychology to design choice 
architectures in ways that steer people’s decisions 
toward a greater individual or public good (Thaler & 
Sunstein, 2008). Nudging is based on the insight that it 
is possible to change people’s behavior—via their envi-
ronment—without changing their minds. Nudging does 
not block, fence off, or significantly burden choices (as 
laws can do); rather, it proposes interventions that are 
meant to be easy, reversible, and cheap to implement. 
It thus represents a form of soft paternalism (also called 
libertarian paternalism). The target of these interven-
tions is choice architectures (for a definition, see Table 
1). In digital environments, the power of choice and 
information architectures over users’ behavior is even 
more significant than in the offline world. No online 
choice is ever made without predesigned context.
Nudging can be achieved in a number of ways—for 
example, by varying the order in which options are 
presented, thus changing their physical and cognitive 
accessibility. Rearranging food options in a cafeteria so 
that healthier foods are more accessible is meant to 
increase healthy food consumption (for systematic 
reviews, see Broers et al., 2017; Bucher et al., 2016). 
The preselected default option, a widely employed 
nudging technique, has a considerable impact on deci-
sions (a meta-analysis by Jachimowicz et al., 2019, pro-
duced a medium-sized effect of d = 0.68). People are 
more likely to accept a preselected option than to select 
a different one ( Jachimowicz et al., 2019); this is due 
to the mechanism of endorsement (defaults are seen as 
signaling what the choice architect wants the decision 
maker to do) or endowment (defaults are perceived to 
reflect the status quo). Benevolent choice architects can 
harness this tendency for causes serving the public 
good, such as increasing organ donation rates ( Johnson 
& Goldstein, 2003; but see Arshad et al., 2019), or the 
good of the individual, such as saving more money for 
retirement through automatic enrollment (Thaler & 
Benartzi, 2004).
Commercial choice architects in online and offline 
environments, however, are privy to the same architec-
tural principles. However, their design decisions are 
typically motivated by maximizing the benefits to the 
service provider rather than to the consumer. Commer-
cial nudging can drive people to inadvertently sub-
scribe to undesirable content or consent to privacy 
settings that are inconsistent with their stated best inter-
ests (see the Persuasive and Manipulative Choice Archi-
tectures section; see also Thaler, 2018, on “sludge”). 
The success and ethical permissibility of nudging thus 
largely depend on the goals of the choice architects 
(commercial or public good) and their alignment with 
the goals and values of individuals. Difficulties arise 
not only in determining people’s best interests or true 
preferences but also in maintaining a balance between 
what is best for different actors (individual decision 
makers, commercial bodies, political institutions) and 
society at large. Another critical issue in discussions on 
nudging is the assumed and actual role of human 
autonomy. Nudges do not eliminate available options 
and are easily reversible (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008, 
p.  236). Yet they substitute autonomous choice with 
preselected “rational” decisions to overcome people’s 
cognitive biases and inadequate decision-making com-
petencies. As Rebonato (2012) argued, even though 
nominal autonomy might be preserved, effective auton-
omy may be reduced (but see also Sunstein, 2015). 
Another unintended consequence of nudging may be 
its potential impact on policy support; low-cost nudges 
might displace support for high-cost measures (e.g., the 
introduction of a green-energy default nudge risks 
diminishing support for a carbon tax; see Hagmann 
et al., 2019).
Educative nudges constitute a category of nudging 
that is explicitly respectful of human autonomy (Sunstein, 
2015). As the name indicates, these interventions 
involve some form of education, for instance in the 
form of additional information (e.g., the nutritional 
quality of foods or the risks of smoking; Sunstein, 
2016a, 2016b). In contrast to noneducative nudges, 
these interventions are transparent to people, engage 
their deliberate faculties, and preserve autonomy of 
choice—which may be why people prefer educative 
nudges. According to a nationally representative survey 
in the United States, a majority of people (between 55% 
and 74% across four topics; n = 430) consistently pre-
ferred educative versions of nudges (also referred to as 
System 2 nudges; e.g., statistical information about the 
risks of smoking, educational campaigns demonstrating 
advantages of green energy) over noneducative nudges 
(also referred to as System 1 nudges; e.g., graphic warn-
ings on cigarette packaging, automatic enrollment in 
green-energy plans) when no information about their 
comparative effectiveness was presented (Sunstein, 
2016b). Likewise, in another representative study in the 
United States ( Jung & Mellers, 2016), participants viewed 
System 1 nudges such as defaults and sequential order-
ings less favorably than they viewed System 2 nudges 
such as educational opportunities and reminders.
Technocognition
Technocognition is an approach proposed by Lewandowsky, 
Ecker, and Cook (2017) that offers a “cognitively-inspired 
design of information architectures” (Lew and ow sky, Cook, 
& Ecker, 2017, p. 419). It suggests that a combination 
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of insights from cognitive science and appropriate 
interventions in digital architectures can help in 
designing technological safeguards against the spread 
of false information or targeted adversarial manipula-
tion. In digital environments, all choices are made in 
a predesigned context. Technocognition considers this 
design context through the lens of cognitive science. 
Cognitively inspired technological interventions can, 
for instance, introduce friction into the process of 
commenting on or sharing information. Consider the 
experiment launched by the Norwegian broadcaster 
NRK as a response to the problem of toxic comment-
ing: Before readers could post a comment on an arti-
cle, they had to pass a brief comprehension quiz on 
what they had read (Lewandowsky, 2020a; Lichterman, 
2017). The friction created by increasing the entry cost 
for participating in online discussions was meant to 
foster deliberate thinking. Crucially, no one was cen-
sored in the process; once a person passed the quiz, 
they were free to comment as usual. Yet this measure, 
unlike a nudge, was meant to fence off certain behav-
iors unless the quiz was answered correctly—trolls 
were not expected to expend the effort required to 
pass the quiz.
Other examples of friction can be combined with 
prompts to engage analytical thinking. For example, 
Fazio (2020) showed that making people pause and 
think to explain why a certain headline was true or 
false can reduce their intention to share false headlines. 
This was not the case for true headlines. Pennycook 
et al. (2019, 2020) also found that introducing reminders 
about accuracy before sharing—thus subtly prompting 
people to attend to accuracy—can reduce people’s 
intention to share false headlines. In this case, techno-
cognition and educative nudging converge.
A simpler version of friction can be used to prevent 
uncontrolled sharing cascades of false and misleading 
information. Instagram introduced an AI-powered fea-
ture in June 2019 that delays posts containing offensive 
comments by notifying users that their comment may 
be considered offensive and allowing them to cancel 
the post (Mosseri, 2019). Messaging app Telegram 
recently introduced a “slow mode” that enables group 
administrators to impose a wait period before users 
respond (Telegram Team, 2019). WhatsApp Messenger’s 
reportedly successful response to mob lynchings in 
India (see the False and Misleading Information sec-
tion) was to limit the number of times a message can 
be shared to five chats—a feature that now applies to 
all users worldwide (WhatsApp, 2018). And most 
recently, Twitter introduced a new prompt (currently, 
as a test among users of Android operating systems) 
that encourages users who want to retweet an article 
that they have not opened yet to read it first (Twitter 
Support, 2020).
The underlying cognitive insights in these cases are 
twofold: First, limiting the number of chats to which a 
message can be forwarded or removing the share but-
ton from media posts introduced a delay, or cooling-off 
period. Cooling-off periods are known to affect peo-
ple’s willingness to engage in an activity (for the effect 
of cooling-off periods on gun violence in the United 
States, see, e.g., Luca et al., 2017). Second, identifying 
a forwarded message as such provided a cue to users 
that the message originated not from a (potentially 
trusted) contact but from elsewhere. These interven-
tions in the information architecture of social media, 
though small and easy to implement technologically, 
can have significant effects given the scale of these 
platforms—a promising point for designing appropriate 
technocognitive solutions in digital environments.
Let us stress, however, that similar techniques can 
also be used to restrict freedom of choice and com-
munication on the Internet, as can be seen in the case 
of authoritarian regimes that use friction to limit citi-
zens’ access to information (Roberts, 2018). It is there-
fore important to ensure that technocognitive 
interventions are designed with people’s best interests 
in mind and with public oversight.
Boosting
Boosting is another class of cognitive interventions 
from psychological science. It responds to the challenge 
of rapidly changing digital environments by aiming to 
foster lasting and generalizable competencies in users 
(see also Hertwig, 2017; Hertwig & Grüne-Yanoff, 2017; 
Hertwig & Ryall, 2020). Boosts target individual cogni-
tive and motivational competencies rather than immedi-
ate behavior (which is the target of nudges) and aim 
to empower people to make better decisions for them-
selves in accordance with their own goals and prefer-
ences. Boosting interventions can be directed at 
domain-specific competencies (e.g., understanding 
health information) and domain-general competencies 
(e.g., statistical literacy). They can target human cogni-
tion (e.g., decision strategies), the environment (e.g., 
information representation), or both (Hertwig & Grüne-
Yanoff, 2017, p. 977). Moreover, in contrast to nudges, 
boosts specifically aim not only to preserve but also to 
foster and extend human agency and autonomy. Boosts 
are by necessity transparent because they require an 
individual’s active cooperation.
One example of boosting is a risk-literacy boost that 
can be applied to quickly educate people about relative 
versus absolute risks in, for instance, the health domain 
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(Gigerenzer et al., 2007). Whereas benefits of drugs are 
often expressed in relative terms, such as “Drug X 
reduces the chance of stroke by 48%” (which suggests 
that the drug is highly effective), this information is 
incomplete and does not permit the user to judge the 
magnitude of the effect. Absolute risk information, by 
contrast, provides easy-to-understand information 
about the magnitude of the drug’s benefit: “Drug X 
reduces the chance of stroke from 28 per 1,000 to 15 
per 1,000.” In this framing, the absolute reduction of 
stroke attributable to the drug is 13 per 1,000 people, 
or merely 1.3%. This risk-literacy boost is a simple, 
memorable rule—“always ask for health statistics to be 
translated into absolute numbers”—that can help peo-
ple make more informed decisions about their health.
Boosting cognitive competencies online by redesign-
ing the environment might involve changing the way 
information is presented to users or providing addi-
tional cues to existing information to improve the epis-
temic quality of online content (Lorenz-Spreen, 
Lewandowsky, et al., 2020). For example, such infor-
mational boosts can draw on research in algorithmic 
detection of false rumors; for example, Vosoughi et al. 
(2017) identified three categories of cues predictive of 
the veracity of online information (in this case, informa-
tion shared on Twitter): people (who spreads the 
news), linguistic content (what words are used), and 
propagation dynamics (the shape of an information 
cascade). The most predictive cue in the study was 
propagation dynamics—a cue rarely detected by 
humans. This hidden cue, however, can be made trans-
parent in design of visual aids (e.g., information icons 
on social-media posts) and can potentially improve the 
credibility of digital information (for more examples, 
see Lorenz-Spreen, Lewandowsky, et al., 2020).
Note that the additional information introduced in 
the environment is easily accessible but does not restrict 
users’ choices or activities. People can decide for them-
selves how much they want to engage with these infor-
mation labels. In contrast to boosts that aim to foster 
long-term competencies, information labels are short-
term interventions that provide quick and context-
appropriate information. However, if one encounters 
them repeatedly, the development of long-term com-
petencies could be spurred. At the same time, when 
evaluating interventions on the basis of informational 
cues (e.g., educational nudges and boosts that alter a 
decision maker’s environment), it is important to check 
their ecological validity and their actual capacity to 
make a difference. Some cues that are often cited as 
providing valuable information (e.g., URLs, publisher’s 
names) are in fact only weak signals that can easily be 
gamed in the current online ecosystem. For instance, 
highlighting the publisher of online articles (main-
stream websites vs. misinformation websites) does not 
improve people’s ability to distinguish between accu-
rate and inaccurate content (Dias et al., 2020). And, as 
Wineburg and Ziv (2019) argued, “dot-org symbolizes 
neither quality nor trustworthiness. It’s a marketing tool 
that relies on a widespread but false association with 
credibility.” Wineburg and McGrew (2019) suggested 
that it is more efficient to invest in teaching people how 
to verify information online (e.g., by boosting compe-
tence in lateral reading, to which we return later) than 
to rely on weak signals and cues. Indeed, interventions 
that trigger attention and deliberation should be more 
effective in the current attention-grabbing online eco-
system (Pennycook et al., 2019).
The entry costs for acquiring a boost should be as 
low as possible, so that many can engage with it. There 
is a role to be played by platforms and regulators to 
deliver easy-to-use cognitive tools to people. This also 
requires that people need to realize that there is a 
problem to begin with. But given survey results on trust 
in social media and the perceived prevalence of false 
information online (e.g., Newman et al., 2020), it is fair 
to say that many people have already woken up to at 
least some of the challenges discussed here. One might 
argue that the boosting approach may be limited in its 
need for active engagement and cognitive effort to 
develop or improve competencies. Indeed, unlike 
nudging, boosting does not bypass cognition and 
agency—it explicitly targets them. However, boosting 
is rooted in a different view of human psychology: It 
views people not as cognitive misers full of biases who 
are unable to make good decisions on their own but 
rather as admittedly bounded decision makers who 
have, however, the ability to learn and to rely on simple 
cognitive strategies that can adapt to uncertain environ-
ments (Hertwig et al., 2019).
Moreover, there is great heterogeneity in factors 
that matter for designing and choosing appropriate 
interventions for digital challenges, including indi-
vidual demographic differences (e.g., age and educa-
tion level) and other dimensions (e.g., affinity with 
technology, political attitudes, and people’s level of 
motivation to learn new competencies). Therefore, 
one should be careful to propose one-size-fits-all solu-
tions. Indeed, some people might not be able or will-
ing to engage with boosts, whereas others would be 
motivated to do so; some people might prefer policies 
that target deliberate processes over nondeliberative 
nudges (e.g., Jung & Mellers, 2016; Sunstein, 2016b). 
It is unlikely that a single solution that accommodates 
all users exists. For this reason, our vision is that of a 
toolbox of interventions that would reach different 
people and tackle different existing and emerging 
challenges.
It is also worth noting that the potential effects of 
any behavioral intervention—be it nudging, boosting, 
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or technocognition—might be low. It is difficult to 
change people’s attitudes and behaviors, especially 
when there are so many intertwining factors in the real 
world and in human psychology that influence why 
people do what they do. Even the effects of what had 
been hoped to be a life-saving nudge—making organ 
donation the default option instead of requiring people 
to opt in ( Johnson & Goldstein, 2003)—appear to fade 
away in the face of the realities of the world (e.g., 
objections of family members; see Arshad et al., 2019). 
Moreover, because digital environments are highly vola-
tile, interventions in the choice architecture itself would 
inevitably be short-lived and subject to gaming. Under 
such adversarial conditions, betting on cognitive effort 
and empowered citizens might be less risky than relying 
on choice architectures that can be overridden at any 
moment by the uncertainty of the offline and online 
worlds. At the very least, boosting should complement 
regulations or nudges.
To summarize, it is possible to distinguish among a 
range of interventions, all informed by psychological 
science and behavioral sciences, that can be harnessed 
to respond to the four challenges of online environ-
ments outlined earlier. Conceptualizing and studying 
these interventions is a task of the highest order. As 
long as regulators fall behind the speed of change in 
digital environments and are hamstrung by the political 
power of Big Tech, interventions informed by scientific 
evidence will be crucial. We next turn to a map of 
boosting interventions in digital environments.
Boosting Cognitive Competencies  
in Online Environments
The interventions we review here are designed to 
simultaneously satisfy two constraints: (a) remedying 
specific problems in the digital world and (b) building 
on existing competencies or fostering new competen-
cies. An important point is that different tools are 
adapted to counter specific challenges. For instance, 
social-media platforms exploit humans’ reward sensitiv-
ity to create hard-to-control habits that these platforms 
subsequently exploit. The best response to manipula-
tive and persuasive choice architecture might therefore 
be to empower users to become choice architects of 
their own proximate digital environment (self-nudging) 
or self-restrict engagement with certain information 
sources (deliberate ignorance) rather than attempt to 
exercise a superhuman ability to detect and resist all 
attempts at influence. By contrast, false information and 
AI-powered persuasive techniques such as targeted 
political advertisement can best be met by people exer-
cising existing competencies (e.g., reasoning and judg-
ment of information reliability) or learning new ones 
(e.g., lateral reading). We thus identify two main groups 
of cognitive boosting tools (Fig. 9): (a) those aimed at 
enhancing people’s agency and autonomy in their digi-
tal environments (e.g., self-nudging and deliberate 
ignorance) and (b) those aimed at boosting reasoning 
and resilience to manipulation to accurately assess con-








Simple strategies and decision aids 
to improve people’s ability to 
efficiently analyze the information 
they encounter on the web.  
Self-imposed interventions in one’s 
proximal digital choice architecture 
with the goal to enhance 
self-control and lower distractions.
A strategic way of selectively filtering 
and blocking out information in order to
control one’s information environment
(e.g., e-mails, news feeds, instant
messages) and reduce exposure to
false and low-utility information.
A preemptive intervention that
boosts people’s cognitive






Fig. 9. Map of boosting interventions for the digital world.
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inoculation). The effectiveness of some of these boosts 
has already been demonstrated experimentally; others 
are supported by evidence collected from neighboring 
areas of research in behavioral and cognitive sciences 
(e.g., research on nudging, self-control, and the use of 
simple heuristics in decision-making under uncer-
tainty). These evidence-based and evidence-informed 
interventions can be presented to users, educators, and 
policy makers in the form of fact boxes, apps, and 
policy recommendations.
Self-nudging: boosting control over 
one’s digital environment
The design of choice architectures that make online 
environments open to adversarial manipulation of user 
behavior can also be used by people to foster self-
control and motivation. Online environments permit—
although rarely encourage—a relatively high level of 
control over one’s choice architecture, such as setting 
one’s own defaults, adjusting notifications, installing ad 
blockers, and organizing one’s digital environment in 
a way that hinders interruptions and undesirable trig-
gers. Users can take control over their digital surround-
ings and exercise freedom and agency by not being 
passive with regard to their environment. Accordingly, 
successful interventions in persuasive and attention-
maximizing environments should aim to enhance peo-
ple’s autonomy and their ability to control and shape 
their digital environments in ways that are consistent 
with their own goals. This does not mean that the 
responsibility for important features of the digital choice 
architecture would be shifted from companies or regu-
lators to users. Taking at least some control of one’s 
proximate online environment must complement other 
policy measures (e.g., data privacy protection by 
default), not replace them—not least because it is effec-
tive only for those who are motivated enough to actively 
intervene in their own choice architecture.
One class of behavioral intervention that focuses on 
engaging with one’s proximate choice environment is 
self-nudging (Reijula & Hertwig, 2020). Self-nudging is 
a cognitive boost that fosters people’s competencies to 
design their proximate environment in a way that works 
best for them. Although nudging redesigns choice archi-
tectures to prompt a behavioral change, self-nudging 
empowers people to act as their own choice architects. 
For example, one can choose to implement a nudge in 
one’s own kitchen by moving tempting but undesirable 
foods to harder-to-reach places. In Duckworth et al.’s 
(2018) classification of self-control strategies, self-
nudging falls into the category of self-deployed situa-
tional strategies. The approach of self-nudging draws 
inspiration from three sources. First and foremost, it 
has explicit roots in nudging and its emphasis on choice 
architecture—but, importantly, it aims to share the psy-
chological knowledge built into nudges with the indi-
vidual. Self-nudging can therefore benefit from the 
accumulated evidence on nudges such as defaults (e.g., 
Jachimowicz et al., 2019) or changes in cognitive and 
spatial accessibility (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008).
Another inspiration for self-nudging comes from eco-
nomic research on commitment devices (Bryan et al., 
2010; Rogers et  al., 2014; Schelling, 1978), used pre-
dominantly to solve self-control problems. “Commit-
ment devices attempt to enforce people’s voluntarily 
imposed restrictions until they have accomplished their 
goals, or their voluntarily imposed penalties for failing 
to accomplish their goals” (Rogers et al., 2014, p. 2065). 
In other words, a commitment device is a way to lock 
oneself into doing something that one might otherwise 
not be able to follow through with. One example is to 
define a health goal such as weight loss and to tell as 
many people as possible about when the goal must be 
reached and the penalty for not reaching it on time (e.g., 
donating to a political campaign one deeply dislikes).
Finally, self-nudging is also related to the notion of 
situational control (Duckworth et al., 2016), to research 
emphasizing the role of environment on habit formation 
(e.g., Wood, 2019), and to behavioral stimulus control—
employed, for instance, in cognitive-behavioral therapy 
to treat insomnia or substance abuse (e.g., Edinger 
et al., 2001; for online addiction, see also Griffiths et al., 
2014). Here, strategic changes are introduced in the 
environment to manage one’s exposure to stimuli that 
exercise control over one’s behavior. For instance, if a 
person is triggered by hyperpalatable stimuli (e.g., sug-
ary food), removing them from the proximate environ-
ment or making them less accessible should strengthen 
the person’s ability to control urges. The same rationale 
can also be applied to one’s information diet. According 
to Wood (2019), the key to self-control in the digital 
domain is in taking control over the contextual cues that 
activate people’s use of technology (e.g., smartphones) 
and adding friction to make undesirable actions (e.g., 
excessive phone use) more difficult (pp. 234–235). In 
what follows, we briefly review three types of self-
nudges that can be enlisted by people to nudge them-
selves away from distracting sources or make their 
desired options more easily available.
Self-nudging by adapting cognitive accessibility. 
The Center for Humane Technology (2019) suggests sev-
eral steps that people can take to exercise more control 
over the time they spend on their devices. For example, 
the variable reinforcement schedules of notifications (see 
Fig. 7) can turn checking one’s phone into a powerful 
habit. People can control these distracting stimuli by 
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turning off notifications for anything not coming directly 
from other people (e.g., news apps) or even by allowing 
notifications only from apps used by their most impor-
tant contacts (e.g., enabling notifications for messenger 
apps they use with friends and family but disabling e-mail 
notifications). They could set specific times in which mes-
sages can be received, thereby reserving periods of time 
for concentrated work (see also Newport, 2016). This mea-
sure can also help convert variable schedules of receiving 
messages to fixed-interval schedules (which are known to 
elicit the lowest rates of responding), thereby potentially 
reducing messages’ addictive character. Further advice 
includes deliberately separating applications that, by one’s 
own standards, improve the quality of time spent online 
(e.g., educational podcasts) and those that do not. This 
can be achieved by rearranging one’s smartphone home 
screen so that only useful apps (e.g., podcasts and medi-
tation apps, as well as tools such as calendars and maps) 
are displayed on the front page, whereas others (e.g., 
social media, games) are tucked away in folders (see Fig. 
10, regarding adaptive cognitive accessibility). Other self-
imposed interventions in one’s digital choice architecture 
include removing social-media apps from one’s mobile 
devices and accessing them from a home computer only 
or deliberately placing devices out of sight to reduce the 
cognitive accessibility of the most distracting platforms.
Self-nudging by adjusting defaults. Defaults, one of 
the most widely employed tools in the choice-architecture 
toolbox, are fertile ground for self-nudging. People can 
take control of their digital default settings, including pri-
vacy settings on social media and settings for personal-
ized advertisements (e.g., https://myactivity.google.com). 
Although it might initially require some time, effort, and 
possibly even guidance to understand how default set-
tings work and their considerable effect on people, self-
command over defaults may prove to be a powerful way 
to return agency and autonomy to users (see Fig. 10, 
regarding adjusting defaults).
Self-nudging with the help of technology. One can 
also make use of apps (e.g., Digital Wellbeing, Cold Tur-
key, Freedom, and Boomerang; see Fig. 10, regarding 
using technology) that allow users to control how much 
time they spend on their phones, to schedule e-mails, or 
to block all notifications for a period of time to maintain 
focus. Being in control, the self-nudger decides which 
goals and tools to prioritize and which to move to the 
background. Another helpful tool in one’s choice archi-
tecture is a monitor of one’s habits of information con-
sumption. Users who aim for balanced reading may 
install a browser that monitors the extent to which their 
reading history is consistent with their goal. The feed-
back from the browser widget would thus work as a 
self-deployed reminder of one’s epistemic goal (Munson 
et al., 2013).
Self-nudging is particularly suited to situations in 
which exercising self-control or resisting temptation is 
difficult or when a choice environment is toxic (i.e., 
when choice architects design highly addictive environ-
ments with nonbenevolent goals in mind; see Hertwig, 
2017). Moreover, self-nudging enhances autonomy 
because it aims to put people in charge of determining 
their own goals and choice environments, thus bypass-
ing the paternalism that can accompany the kind of 
nudging that capitalizes on people’s deficiencies rather 
than attempting to educate them. “Self-nudging means 
that people intentionally nudge themselves in order to 
self-regulate their behavior and break self-destructive 
habits. When the nudger and the nudged are . . . the 
same person, as in the case of self-nudging, autonomy 
and agency remain intact” (Hertwig, 2017, p. 155). A 
sense of agency is crucial for self-nudging. As a Pew 
Research Center survey showed, users who think they 
have more control over their news feeds tend to influ-
ence the content of their Facebook feeds more than 
users who think they have no control do (Smith, 
2018a).22
Let us also highlight the potential limitations of self-
nudging. Although a perceived sense of control is cru-
cial for exercising agency, it should be backed up by 
appropriate affordances in the environment. As dis-
cussed previously, persuasive design can create an 
illusion of control and still nudge users away from 
privacy-friendly choices (e.g., Norwegian Consumer 
Council, 2018). Moreover, if individuals’ perceived 
control over the release of and access to private infor-
mation is increased, it can, paradoxically, increase 
their willingness to disclose sensitive information (“the 
control paradox”; Brandimarte et al., 2013). For exam-
ple, users can have a strong feeling of control on 
Facebook because they can change their default pri-
vacy settings and adjust who will see what type of 
information in their profiles. At the same time, they 
have very little control over the way in which the 
information they share will be used by the platform, 
by third-party applications, or even by their friends. 
We hold that self-nudging efforts should be comple-
mented by reasonable regulations and online tools23 
that not only give users more control over their digital 
environments (e.g., empowering them to customize 
the design of their own social-media news feed; see 
Lorenz-Spreen, Lewandowsky, et  al., 2020) but also 
ensure that personal information is protected regard-
less of users’ actions.
Finally, self-nudging will hinge on the ability and 
willingness of psychologists and public choice archi-
tects to let citizens in on the secrets of nudging. The 
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Keep Your Phone Away
Set Default “Do Not Disturb” Times
Control Privacy and Personalization 
Settings in Your Online Accounts
Control Privacy Defaults in Your Browser
Control Your Screen Time
• Track the time you spend on your device. For 
Apple, use Screen Time. For Android, consider 
installing ActionDash, Digital Wellbeing, or 
Moment. 
• Selectively control and block apps on your 
phone using Freedom or Boomerang. 
Temporarily block your phone using Cold 
Turkey. 
Use Ad Blockers
Use Privacy Protecting Browsers and
Search Engines  
Use a VPN
• Use gray scale to decrease the attrac-
tiveness of sensory stimuli, such as the 
color of notifications or the appealing 
colorful design of most apps.
• Turn off all notifications, banners, and 
badges, except from apps in which real 
people (or just people you want to hear 
from) want your attention.
• Remove the most time-consuming 
and distracting apps (e.g., social media, 
games) from your phone and access 
them from your home computer only. 
• Review your privacy and advertise-
ment settings on your online accounts, 
such as Google, Facebook, Twitter, and 
Amazon (e.g., https://myaccount.google.com
/activitycontrol).
• Configure your browser (e.g., Firefox) 
to erase your cache and cookies auto-
matically every time you close it. 
Enable tracking protection and Do 
Not Track to block online trackers 
from collecting your browser data. 
• Adjust the times at which your 
phone will automatically switch to 
silent mode (e.g., during your sleep-
ing hours). In this mode, alarms will 
still ring or vibrate but calls and 
messages will not.
• Limit your home screen to just tools−−
the apps you use for quick in-and-out
tasks such as maps, camera, 
calendar, notes. 
• Move the rest of your apps, especially 
those you wish to deprioritize, off the
home screen and into folders. 
• Charge your device outside of your 
bedroom. Keep your phone out of 
reach during important activities that 
need your attention (e.g., work, time 
with your children, dinner with family 
and friends).
• Use privacy-focused browsers, such as 
Firefox or Brave.
• Use privacy-focused search engines, 
such as DuckDuckGo or Startpage.
• Use the “incognito” mode in your browser. 
• Use a VPN (especially on public Wi-Fi) 
that encrypts your web traffic so no 
one can see which sites you’re visiting 
or what you’re doing while you’re there 
(e.g., NordVPN).
• Prevent ads from being loaded to your 
browser with an ad blocker (e.g., 
UBlock, AdBlock Plus, AdBlock).
Fig. 10. Self-nudging interventions in online environments. A summary of potential self-nudging interventions 
to enhance people’s control over their digital environments and their privacy protection online. Based in part 
on Center for Humane Technology (2019) and Epstein (2017). Icons are used under license from Adobe Stock.
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psychological principles behind nudges are not well 
known to the general public, even though they are 
relatively easy to explain and easy to understand: For 
instance, reduced cognitive accessibility is what keeps 
people from snacking on hard-to-reach cookies or 
opening the social-media apps they removed from their 
home screen. One possible—and certainly welcome—
side effect of self-nudging may be that people become 
more aware of the extent to which mundane environ-
mental factors, both online and offline, sway human 
behavior and become more curious about how they 
can turn their proximate environments into allies.
Deliberate ignorance as information 
management device
In 1807, Thomas Jefferson condemned the “polluted 
vehicle” of newspapers, claiming that “the man who 
never looks into a newspaper is better informed than 
he who reads them; inasmuch as he who knows noth-
ing is nearer to truth than he whose mind is filled with 
falsehoods and errors” (1999, p. 275). The current chal-
lenge of information overload and environments 
designed to compete for human attention by offering 
rewards and hyperpalatable stimuli brings new signifi-
cance to this statement. The challenge is amplified by 
the proliferation of politically motivated agents that 
specialize in the cultural production of ignorance, 
including the organized campaigns that undermine the 
public’s perception of the scientific consensus around 
climate change to thwart policy initiatives (Oreskes & 
Conway, 2011; Proctor & Schiebinger, 2008). Techno-
logical advances have fostered novel methods for pro-
ducing ignorance and putting the very existence of 
objective truths into question. The flooding technique 
is one such method. The Chinese government is esti-
mated to create and post about 448 million social-media 
comments per year—not to address controversial issues 
or even to argue with critics of the party and the gov-
ernment, but rather to divert attention from real issues 
(e.g., the government’s lackluster response to natural 
disasters) toward trivial and scandalous stories that are 
injected online for the sole purpose of distracting the 
public from discovering government weaknesses (King, 
Pan, & Roberts, 2017; Roberts, 2018).
Readers of digital media face a constant trade-off 
between staying informed about current events and 
being exposed to an information environment in which 
numerous players (e.g., companies, advertisers, media, 
and policy makers) design hyperpalatable mental stim-
uli to hijack people’s limited attention. Much as obeso-
genic environments are replete with foods designed to 
offer maximal sensory pleasure, informationally fatten-
ing environments degrade consumers’ control and 
autonomy over the information they consume (Craw-
ford, 2015). When low-quality clickbait stories, con-
spiracy theories, and fake news masquerade as 
meaningful information, epistemic abstinence becomes 
more rational than epistemic indulgence. In other 
words, more information is not always better. To man-
age information overload, one must ignore a large 
amount of incoming material and separate useful infor-
mation from noise, false news, or harmful advice. In 
this context, deliberate ignorance can be used as one 
tool for information management (Hertwig & Engel, 
2016, 2020).
Hertwig and Engel (2016) defined deliberate igno-
rance as the “conscious individual or collective choice 
not to seek or use information (or knowledge)”—par-
ticularly when the “marginal acquisition costs are neg-
ligible and the potential benefits potentially large” 
(p. 360). The idea that deliberate ignorance can be an 
ecologically rational strategy does not align with clas-
sical ideals of epistemic virtue and rationality (see 
Kozyreva & Hertwig, 2019), which presume that infor-
mation and knowledge have intrinsic value for decision 
makers because they allow them to accumulate more 
evidence (e.g., Carnap, 1947), acquire better under-
standing, and ultimately make more informed and ratio-
nal choices (e.g., Blackwell, 1953; Good, 1967). 
However, deliberate ignorance is a reasonable strategy 
in many situations—for instance, in the interest of 
impartiality and to shield oneself from biases (e.g., see 
MacCoun, 2020). One concrete example is the practice 
of blind auditioning for orchestras, in which candidates 
play behind a screen to hide their identities. As sug-
gested by Goldin and Rouse’s (2000) analysis, the intro-
duction of this policy has contributed to a substantial 
increase in the proportion of women in orchestras dur-
ing the second half of the 20th century. Another exam-
ple of deliberate ignorance: a person who has been 
diagnosed with a serious illness decides to not ask 
about a prognosis. This can be seen as an irrational 
avoidance of information fueled by the prospect of a 
bleak future. Alternatively, however, it can be viewed 
as the person’s affirmation of their informational auton-
omy and their legitimate desire to protect themselves 
from the weight of a menacing—and not necessarily 
accurate—timeline.
People deliberately ignore information for various 
reasons—for instance, to avoid emotional costs (e.g., 
choosing not to test for a rare genetic disease), to ben-
efit from strategic ignorance (e.g., in negotiations), or 
to maximize suspense and surprise (see Hertwig & 
Engel, 2016). Hertwig and Engel (2016) also suggested 
that deliberate ignorance could be a mental device to 
boost cognitive sustainability and information manage-
ment, especially in the digital world. They argued,
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For humans, who are hardwired to monitor their 
environment, the ability to allocate one’s limited 
attentional resources reasonably is therefore 
becoming increasingly valuable in today’s world. 
Indeed, the ability to select a few valuable pieces 
of information and deliberately ignore others may 
become a core cultural competency to be taught 
in school like reading and writing. (p. 364)24
Online health information is an environment in which 
deliberate ignorance can be a helpful and reasonable 
tool for managing information. Although online access 
to health information can increase people’s knowledge 
and foster beneficial health-related decision-making 
( Jacobs, Amuta, & Jeon, 2017), the abundance of low-
quality sources with user-contributed content—such 
as blogs, online forums, celebrity web pages, and 
social networking sites—puts people at risk of becom-
ing victims of bad health advice or even conspiracy 
theories.25
Tempting, highly unrepresentative, and possibly 
even misleading information environments (e.g., health 
claims about miracle cures or breakthroughs that are 
too good to be true, inflammatory false claims that a 
vaccine causes mental retardation; see Thomas, Tandoc, 
& Hinnant, 2017) are difficult to navigate. One ecologi-
cally rational strategy in such environments is to abstain 
from seeking out these narratives; to avoid searching 
for one’s symptoms in search engines; and to ignore 
health advice from influencers, celebrities, or com-
menters in online forums. As in the case of blind audi-
tioning, people may choose to shield themselves from 
eye-catching and tempting information that they can 
expect will distort their judgments. Given the scarcity 
of high-quality health information online, the ability to 
intentionally ignore low-value persuasive sources is an 
important skill. For example, Oxman and Paulsen 
(2019) identified only three websites that met their 
inclusion criteria for evidence-based aggregation of 
health information: Cochrane Evidence, Informed 
Health, and PubMed Health. Others are likely to exist 
(e.g., the National Health Service website in the UK). 
The next step would be to make the information on 
these websites publicly accessible and easily under-
standable (e.g., in fact boxes; see McDowell et al., 2016).
Let us emphasize two further key points: First, by 
advocating deliberate ignorance as a tool for the online 
world, we are not advocating for the proliferation of 
ignorance, echo chambers, and a return to the Dark 
Ages. An informed public remains the cornerstone of 
democracy, and widespread education is one of its 
highest achievements. Moreover, the accessibility of 
information offered by the Internet should be regarded 
as a public good. Our emphasis on deliberate ignorance 
as a tool for information management focuses on its 
strategic use to shield oneself from the excesses, traps, 
and information disorders of the current digital environ-
ment. Second, notwithstanding the common—and fre-
quently justified—connotation of ignorance as an 
expression of mental indiscipline and indolence, delib-
erate ignorance (as conceptualized by Hertwig & Engel, 
2020) requires cognitive and motivational resources 
(e.g., executive control, self-control). Online, informed 
deliberate ignorance also requires, somewhat ironically, 
knowledge—such as an understanding of what consti-
tutes a reliable indicator of trustworthiness. It is there-
fore encouraging that laypeople—on average and 
across the political spectrum—have been shown to be 
collectively quite good at distinguishing between 
sources of lower and higher quality and to place more 
trust in media outlets with stronger editorial norms than 
in sources that are hyperpartisan or peddle fake news 
(Pennycook & Rand, 2019a). In the next section, we 
address strategies for discerning whether sources (e.g., 
websites) offer reliable information or not.
Simple decision aids: boosting digital-
information literacy
The concept of digital-information literacy encompasses 
the skills and competencies that are needed to success-
fully navigate the digital-information ecosystem so as 
to obtain, understand, and use information in a variety 
of online contexts (Sparks, Katz, & Beile, 2016). One 
aspect of digital-information and digital-media literacy 
is the ability to analyze and evaluate the information 
people encounter online, including judgment of infor-
mation reliability or evaluation of sources and evidence. 
Kahne and Bowyer (2017) demonstrated a positive 
impact of media-literacy education on young people’s 
ability to evaluate news accuracy and to distinguish 
between evidence-based and false claims in online 
posts. Formal education in such skills is becoming 
increasingly more important, but it is also slow and 
effortful and is unlikely to engage older people. The 
idea behind simple decision aids for digital-information 
literacy is therefore to complement educational pro-
grams by providing people (young and old alike) with 
simple strategies and decision aids that can help evalu-
ate information encountered online. The goal is to fos-
ter good habits that are as simple and automatic as 
washing one’s hands or scanning the crosswalk before 
making a turn (Caulfield, 2018).
One way to design such simple tools makes use of 
the skill set of professional fact-checkers, who are 
experts in evaluating the reliability of information. In 
order to develop a set of rules based on this skill set, 
researchers from the Stanford History Education group 
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(Wineburg & McGrew, 2019) asked 45 participants (10 
professional fact-checkers, 10 history professors, and 
25 undergraduate students) to evaluate the trustworthi-
ness of information online. Wineburg and McGrew 
(2019) argued that the key to experts’ success in fact-
checking is their strategy of lateral reading, a heuristic 
rule that allows them to “read less and learn more” by 
looking to verify the claim outside of the original post. 
Contrary to the professors and students, who focused 
on the information source itself, fact-checkers (the most 
successful group of participants across several fact-
checking tasks) spent most of their time verifying the 
source and the evidence behind the claim by checking 
information about it on the Web. “Instead of spending 
precious minutes scouring an unfamiliar site, checkers 
left it immediately. They ‘read laterally,’ opening up 
multiple tabs across their screens and researching the 
organization. They learned most about a site, paradoxi-
cally, by leaving it” (Ziv & Wineburg, 2020). In a similar 
vein, Graves (2017) attested that the key to professional 
fact-checkers’ analysis lies “in discovering a claim’s ori-
gin and reconstructing its spread” (p. 525).
Drawing inspiration from fact-checkers’ strategies, 
researchers identified simple rules geared at boosting 
competence in civic online reasoning. This competency 
includes three subcompetencies: evaluation of the 
source, evaluation of the evidence, and lateral reading. 
One way of representing these competencies is through 
simple questions: (a) Who is behind this information? 
(b) What is the evidence? (c) What do other sources 
say? (Breakstone et  al., 2018, p. 221). McGrew et  al. 
(2019) found that after two 75-min lessons on evaluat-
ing the credibility of online sources (an extended ver-
sion of the three questions outlined above), students 
in the treatment condition (n = 29) tested on their 
online reasoning skills were more than twice as likely 
to score higher at posttest than at pretest, whereas 
students in the control condition (n = 38) were equally 
likely to score higher or lower at posttest than at pre-
test, indicating that the intervention was successful. As 
a quick boosting intervention, rules based on these 
questions can be presented in the form of simple tips 
on how to verify claims in, for instance, users’ social-
media feeds (see Fig. 11 for an example).
Another set of digital literacy rules has recently been 
introduced to improve people’s ability to distinguish 
between false and mainstream news. This intervention—
Facebook’s “Tips to spot false news”—aims to provide 
simple rules that help people identify suspicious infor-
mation and false news. The tips include, for example, 
advice to be skeptical of catchy headlines, to investigate 
the “about” page and the URL, and to look for other 
reports on the news claim (Facebook, n.d.). The results 
of a randomized controlled study showed that exposure 
to this intervention reduced the perceived accuracy of 
both mainstream and false news headlines in the United 
States and India (with the exception of rural popula-
tions), but effects on false news were significantly larger 
although still relatively modest (in the United States, 
the perceived accuracy of false headlines decreased by 
nearly 0.3 points on a 4-point scale). Note that the 
improvement in performance in headline-accuracy rat-
ing did not depend on the headlines’ alignment with 
respondents’ political predispositions (Guess, Lerner, 
et al., 2020).
Further examples of simple decision aids that can 
be designed to foster better information literacy are 
fast-and-frugal decision trees (FFTs; Luan et al., 2011; 
Martignon et al., 2008). Already in use in a variety of 
domains, including medicine, finance, law, and manage-
ment, FFTs provide comprehensive prescriptive guides 
for real-world decision-making (Hafenbrädl et al., 2016). 
They rank decision criteria in the order of importance 
and offer a potential exit at each point. To make a deci-
sion, a person goes through the cues sequentially. For 
example, medical professionals can use a simple deci-
sion tree to quickly categorize trauma patients into those 
who need immediate medical attention and those whose 
treatment can be delayed (one such system, called sim-
ple triage and rapid treatment [START], was used in New 
York City hospitals during the World Trade Center attack 
in 2001; see L. Cook, 2001). Cues in this case are framed 
as questions: Is the patient walking? If yes, delay treat-
ment; if no, proceed to the following cue. Implementing 
and understanding an FFT is easy; it requires nothing 
more than knowledge of the order of the cues and their 
exit conditions.26
There are not many examples of simple decision aids 
for the online domain. But one short intervention has 
already been applied to improve people’s ability to use 
linguistic cues to distinguish between authentic and fic-
titious online reviews (Banerjee et al., 2017). Likewise, 
FFTs could be designed and tested as decision aids to 
choices such as whether to trust information encoun-
tered online. Figure 12 shows a potential decision tree 
based on the rules for fact-checking identified by 
Breakstone et  al. (2018) and Wineburg and McGrew 
(2019). The FFT advances through the cues sequentially 
and ends when the answer is “no,” which indicates that 
the information is not trustworthy and should not be 
shared. It is noteworthy that a decision can often be 
made at the first step (which contributes to the FFT’s 
frugality) because it usually involves the best cue. FFTs 
work best with strong cues or signals, but in some cases 
a combination of weak signals—such as the top-level 
domain (e.g., .com or .gov), how the social-media name 
is spelled, the “about” page, and cues for verified 
accounts or promoted material—can be used (with the 
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help of the tallying strategy). However, all these signals 
must be taken with caution. For example, a fishy top-
level domain (e.g., com.co) is a signal that the source 
may be untrustworthy, but the opposite is not necessar-
ily true (e.g., a .gov domain does not guarantee trust-
worthiness). It is clear that cues for trustworthiness can 
be gamed, and fake news websites can appear to be as 
genuine and well designed as the websites of real news 
organizations. That is why strong negative signals such 
as an unfamiliar website should be taken seriously, and 
unfamiliar sources should always be verified using the 
lateral-reading strategy. As a general rule of thumb for 
constructing FFTs, cues that are difficult to game should 
take precedence over those that are easy to game.
Like any cognitive tool in the toolbox of digital deci-
sion makers, simple decision aids must be used under 
appropriate conditions. For example, lateral reading is 
an effective tool for verifying the information encoun-
tered on a suspicious website or social-media feed, but 
it may not be the best strategy for reading trusted mate-
rial that benefits from concentration and focus on one 
source. Likewise, decision trees are appropriate tools 
for dichotomous decisions (e.g., whether to trust or 
share a news item or not) but they might not be helpful 
for complex choices that require more sophisticated 
deliberation.
Inoculation: boosting cognitive resilience 
to misinformation and manipulation
Another cognitive intervention against false information 
and online manipulation is inoculation, also known as 
True or False? To Share or Not To Share?
Before you trust this information or press “share,”
slow down and check the source of the post or its
claims. For example, search using keywords.
Search results quickly show 
that the claim is false.
Fig. 11. A simple lateral-reading boost. Based on research by the Stanford History 
Education Group (Breakstone et al., 2018; McGrew et al., 2019; Wineburg & McGrew, 
2019). Icons are used under license from Adobe Stock.
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Can You Trust This Information?
Fast-and-Frugal Decison Tree
Check for source reliability: Pay attention to
the name of the source, its spelling, and
cues for promoted material. If the site or the
author is unfamiliar, always use search
engines and Wikipedia to check its origin.
Check for any factual evidence or reasonable 
arguments supporting the claim. Pay 
attention to the quality of references, cited 






Conduct independent Internet searches
on the veracity of claims. Use search 
engines and fact-checking websites. 
No Evidence Good Evidence
Discredit Confirm
Fig. 12. “Can you trust this information?”: This fast-and-frugal decision tree provides users with three crucial steps for evaluating 
the trustworthiness of information online. Based on research by the Stanford History Education Group (Breakstone et al., 2018; 
Wineburg & McGrew, 2019). Icons are used under license from Adobe Stock.
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prebunking. It targets people’s ability to recognize mis-
leading or manipulative strategies before they encoun-
ter them face-to-face or online. Metaphorically speaking, 
if disinformation is a disorder, then inoculation can 
immunize people against certain strains of false and 
misleading information. Inoculation is preemptive: It 
aims to expose people to misleading or manipulative 
strategies and to neutralize their disruptive potential 
before people actually encounter them in the world 
(for more on the inoculation theory, see Compton, 2013; 
McGuire & Papageorgis, 1961). Inoculation differs from 
debunking strategies, which refute false claims only 
after they have been seen or heard; it is thus especially 
valuable, given that disinformation is often resistant to 
debunking after the fact (J. Cook et al., 2017; Lewandowsky 
et al., 2012). Furthermore, unlike topic-specific debunk-
ing, inoculation is intended to instill domain-general 
competence in recipients to enable them to see through 
attempts at manipulation (Roozenbeek & van der Lin-
den, 2019), making it a particularly suitable cognitive 
strategy when fact-checking or evidence-based refuta-
tion is costly or unavailable.
According to J. Cook et al. (2017) there are two com-
ponents to inoculation: first, an explicit warning about 
a potential threat of disinformation or manipulation—for 
example, a warning about attempts to cast doubt on 
the scientific consensus on climate change that create 
a chimerical set of “experts” who disagree with the 
consensus. The second step refutes an anticipated argu-
ment, thus exposing the disinformation strategy and 
rendering its deceptive nature transparent. In our cli-
mate-change example, this could take the shape of an 
illustration and an explanation of a particular deceptive 
technique used to question a scientific consensus or 
otherwise manipulate the public ( J. Cook et al., 2017, 
p. 4). In the study by J. Cook et al. (2017), the inocula-
tion consisted of showing participants the “fake experts” 
strategy used by the tobacco industry in the 1960s (a 
tobacco ad with the text “20,679 Physicians say ‘Luckies 
are less irritating’”). The same strategy was used by 
climate-science denialists: The Oregon Petition denied 
human-caused effects on the Earth’s atmosphere and 
was signed by 31,000 alleged experts, of whom 99% 
had no expertise in climate science. By exposing par-
ticipants to a weakened version27 of disinformation, this 
intervention provided them with a counterargument. 
The efficacy of inoculation in preventing acceptance of 
disinformation has been established in several experi-
ments ( J. Cook et al., 2017; van der linden, Leiserowitz, 
et al., 2017) and inspired the creation of Bad News, an 
educational game on fake news (Roozenbeek & van 
der Linden, 2018, 2019).
The Bad News study aimed to extend the effects of 
inoculation beyond a particular topic (such as climate 
change) and develop a “broad-spectrum vaccine” 
against disinformation (Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 
2019, p. 2). It focused on the tactics commonly used to 
produce disinformation, rather than on the content of 
a specific disinformation campaign. The study provided 
an active type of inoculation (see Table 4) by having 
participants play a game (https://getbadnews.com/) in 
which they learned six strategies often used to spread 
disinformation (according to NATO Strategic Commu-
nications Centre of Excellence, 2017): impersonating 
people or famous sources online, producing provoca-
tive emotional content, amplifying group polarization, 
floating conspiracy theories, discrediting opponents, 
and trolling (summarized in Fig. 6). The underlying idea 
of the game is that people train to become expert 
manipulators by applying different disinformation tech-
niques. In doing so, they develop competence in detect-
ing manipulation, which will help them realize when 
manipulative strategies are being applied to them in 
the future. The game environment represents a weak-
ened form of real-world social media (where people 
are apt to encounter false information). The inoculation 
effects of the Bad News game were observed by com-
paring preintervention and postintervention credibility 
ratings of various fake-news items (n = 14,266; d = 0.52 
average across all items). The effects were most pro-
nounced for individuals who had been more suscep-
tible to fake-news headlines in the first place (d = 0.89). 
Similar effect sizes (d = 0.60) were found in a follow-up 
randomized controlled study by Basol et al., (2020) that 
Table 4. Structure of Experimental Inoculation Interventions
Inoculation Type 1 
(passive)
Warning about potential 
misinformation or 
manipulation 
(e.g., about attempts to cast 
doubts on scientific consensus 
on climate change)
Refutation of an anticipated argument 
in a weakened form 
(e.g., an example and an 




participants to the 
same strategy used 
by climate science 
denialists)
Inoculation Type 2 
(active)
Preintervention test 
(e.g., ratings of fake news 
credibility)
Active learning 
(e.g., the Bad News game, which 
aims to present main disinformation 
strategies in a weakened, fun way)
Postintervention test 
(e.g., credibility ratings 
of fake news)
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compared the efficacy of the Bad News game interven-
tion with that of a control condition. Both studies (Basol 
et al., 2020; Roozenbeek & van der Linden, 2019) found 
that none of the observed main effects “revealed an 
interaction with political ideology, suggesting that the 
intervention works as a ‘broad-spectrum’ vaccine across 
the political spectrum” (Basol et al., 2020, p. 5).
Inoculation aims to boost cognitive resilience to dis-
information and manipulation (van der Linden, Maibach, 
et al., 2017). As is the case with all the interventions 
we have discussed, it is an efficient strategy when it fits 
particular challenges in the environment and the cogni-
tive competencies involved. Inoculation interventions 
must be based on an understanding of the manipulative 
strategies being used online and how they work. Fur-
thermore, people must be willing to be inoculated—
that is, to take the time to learn about these techniques. 
Another limitation of inoculation is that it is ineffective 
in the face of unexpected or novel deceptive tech-
niques. Thus, as with vaccines in the physical world, it 
makes sense to be prepared for the most insidious and 
common methods of online manipulation and to regu-
larly update inoculation techniques. The logic of inocu-
lation can be extended beyond misinformation to other 
challenges—for instance, helping people detect manip-
ulation through personalized political advertisement 
that exploits people’s psychological identities and vul-
nerabilities (Lorenz-Spreen, Geers, et al., 2020). 
Conclusion: From Psychological 
Science to the Internet for Citizens
Technological innovations have frequently been associ-
ated with dystopian fears. As far back as 370 BCE, 
thinkers such as Socrates were deeply concerned about 
the detrimental consequences of writing:
In fact, it [writing] will introduce forgetfulness into 
the soul of those who learn it: they will not practice 
using their memory because they will put their trust 
in writing, which is external and depends on signs 
that belong to others, instead of trying to remember 
from the inside, completely on their own. . . . Your 
invention will enable them to hear many things 
without being properly taught, and they will 
imagine that they have come to know much while 
for the most part they will know nothing. (Plato, 
ca. 370 B.C.E./1997, pp. 551–552)
Today’s concerns about, for instance, the potential 
effects of Google on memory (e.g., Sparrow, Liu, & 
Wegner, 2011) and comprehension, or about digital 
amnesia or digital dementia (e.g., Spitzer, 2012), echo 
Socrates’s fear of forgetfulness and shallow comprehen-
sion. Socrates was not necessarily wrong—it might well 
be the case that the capacity of human memory has 
fundamentally changed from the time knowledge was 
transmitted orally. Yet he did not foresee the wide range 
of benefits—including the invention of the Internet—
that were rendered possible by this new form of com - 
munication.
Honoring this lesson, we are cognizant of the risk 
of conjuring up dystopian fears. The current and future 
benefits of the digital revolution are immense. Yet 
hopes for a digital utopia did not survive the harsh light 
of reality, and the original optimistic narrative of libera-
tion technology (Diamond, 2010) has been gradually 
replaced by one that is raising grave concerns about 
“surveillance capitalism” (Zuboff, 2019). A growing 
body of evidence reveals worrying implications of the 
digital transformation, and at least four aspects of the 
transformation cause particular concern.
First, unlike previous communication innovations, 
which permeated societies on time scales of centuries 
(e.g., writing) or decades (e.g., telephony), today’s digi-
tal transformations occur at a breathtaking pace. Apps 
can appear outdated within a few months, and the life 
cycle of information technologies is notoriously short. 
The comparatively slow pace of academic research, 
with its cycle of prolonged peer review and revision, 
cannot fully capture, let alone influence, those trans - 
formations.
Second, the problem of speed is compounded by 
the degree of mutation that technology can undergo. 
Whereas the psychological affordances of writing 
changed little during the transition from parchment 
and quill to paper and pencil, new digital technologies 
can create new psychological affordances in an instant. 
For example, the seemingly trivial addition of a 
“retweet” button has made it possible for a small num-
ber of people—or indeed, nonhuman “bots”—to trigger 
global informational cascades (e.g., Bastos & Mercea, 
2019).
Third, the implications of those mutations cannot be 
anticipated. WhatsApp did not anticipate that the ease 
with which material can be shared would contribute to 
mob killings, and Facebook probably did not anticipate 
that a platform designed for staying in touch with 
friends and family could end up influencing the out-
come of elections through dark ads and misinformation 
( Jamieson, 2018).
Finally, and perhaps most troubling, is that this digi-
tal transformation is occurring in what is largely a regu-
latory vacuum. There is nothing to stop platforms from 
radically altering their interfaces overnight, with 
unknown consequences for society and democracy—a 
situation recently brought into focus by Facebook’s 
decision to allow the distribution of false statements in 
political advertisement under the argument of free 
speech protection (Facebook, 2019).
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A recent report from the RAND Corporation (Mazarr 
et al., 2019) condensed those concerns into a number 
of future scenarios, described under the umbrella term 
of the “emerging risk of virtual societal warfare.” Mazarr 
et al. (2019) pointed to associated social trends, such 
as declining faith in institutions that help to sustain 
social truths that are generally agreed upon (e.g., the 
media), weakened measures of social capital (e.g., 
social trust and civic engagement), increased partisan 
polarization across many countries, a rise in populist 
movements and, last but not least, what various scholars 
(e.g., Specter, 2009, p. 33) have described as a sense of 
alienation and a loss of agency and ontological security 
(Giddens, 1991). People’s trust in social institutions, 
their interpersonal exchanges, the stability and reli-
ability of facts, and even their sense of shared reality 
are being undermined. One of the future digital sce-
narios considered by Mazarr et al. is called “the death 
of reality.” Envisaged for 2023, it is the point at which 
the “ability to manufacture seemingly tangible reality 
from scratch has . . . become commonplace” (p. 99). 
Present-day antecedents for this scenario can be found 
in the radical constructivist ontology of truth employed 
by practitioners of “post-truth” discourse (Lewandowsky, 
2020b). Arguably, this scenario can materialize only 
within a digital information architecture that permits 
people to personalize all of reality along with their 
preferences for deodorants.
The focus of this article has been on challenges that 
threaten people’s agency, their choice autonomy, and 
the epistemic quality of their information environment. 
Many other challenges exist and new ones are quickly 
emerging, such as the massive amounts of highly plau-
sible but fabricated video and audio material known 
as deepfakes that are further deflating confidence in a 
shared reality. In an increasingly “onlife” world (Floridi, 
2014), behavioral sciences, social sciences, law, com-
puter science, and—we believe—psychological sci-
ence in particular face important tasks. One is to 
measure and understand the psychological effects of 
these revolutionary transformations. Another is to 
develop and design policy interventions that help peo-
ple cope with the consequences of those transforma-
tions. Focusing on the four challenges of online 
environments, we outlined various classes of interven-
tions that are informed by the behavioral sciences, then 
focused in on interventions aimed at empowering 
people; returning a sense of agency to people (e.g., 
the citizen as a choice architect); and fostering auton-
omy, self-control, and resistance to being manipulated 
in the digital world—in other words, interventions 
meant to cultivate a sense of self-efficacy and ontologi-
cal security (see Fig. 13).
These four types of tools can also be summarized as 
four simple rules for mindful Internet behavior that 
could become as routine as washing one’s hands or 
checking for cars before crossing the street:
1. Control and organize your digital environment. 





• Recognition of manipulation
• Evaluation of sources and evidence
• Attention and self-control
• Autonomous agency 
• Inoculation
• Simple decision aids
• Deliberate ignorance 
• Self-nudging
• Distractive environments
• False and misleading information
• AI-assisted information architectures
• Manipulative choice architectures
Fig. 13. Map of challenges and boosts in the digital world. Icons 
are used under license from Adobe Stock.
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2. Learn to ignore and filter out nonessential and 
misleading information.
3. Make a habit of using simple rules for data pri-
vacy and information literacy.
4. Immunize yourself against the most common and 
dangerous types of manipulation and dis - 
infor mation.
For policy makers, these rules can mean:
1. Ensure that users have adequate control over 
their digital environments and personal data. 
Make it easy for them to take the reins.
2. Make it easy for people to separate useful infor-
mation from noise and disinformation—for 
instance, by mandating clear, intuitive indicators 
of epistemic quality.
3. With the help of researchers, design simple rules 
for data privacy and information literacy and 
provide them to users.
4. Monitor common types of online disinformation 
and manipulation and provide appropriate and 
timely inoculations.
We have no illusions. There is no single solution for 
these and many other challenges. It is very likely that 
these interventions will be shown to have some ben-
efits, but only for some users. Nevertheless, it is impor-
tant to start, and soon: Several surveys show that people 
are concerned about data privacy, the spread of false 
information, political manipulation, and online harass-
ment (e.g., Directorate-General for Communication, 
2018; Kozyreva et al., 2020; Mitchell et al., 2019; Newman 
et al., 2020). Any solution will require the orchestrated 
efforts of regulators, policy makers, educators, and 
users—for instance, boosting people’s ability to control 
the default parameters of their choice architectures 
should be accompanied by a regulatory framework that 
takes the heterogeneity of users into account. Specifi-
cally, the law could be used to prevent companies from 
taking advantage of the fact that some citizens fail to 
take control of their default privacy settings (e.g., the 
EU’s GDPR, embracing insights from the behavioral 
sciences, mandates that data controllers can no longer 
use opt-out as a default for obtaining consent to data 
processing).
The rules and design of Internet landscapes are pre-
dominantly dictated by major corporations and signal 
a lack of a coherent regulatory framework for transpar-
ent and robust user protection. Contrary to promises 
of the early digital era (e.g., access to information for 
all, empowered minorities, unsuppressed democratic 
deliberation), citizens find themselves in a state of con-
stant information overload, surveillance, manipulation, 
and digital divide. We believe that psychological sci-
ence must contribute to the long-term goal of designing 
and fostering the “Internet for citizens,” an online world 
respectful of fundamental human rights and values that 
will require users to learn new competencies and make 
active decisions. One may think this is an unrealistic 
ideal. Yet one need look no further than the digital 
world itself for evidence of the spectacular human abil-
ity to learn: Fifty years ago, Neil Armstrong became the 
first person to step onto the moon. And yet, at that time, 
it was hard to imagine with what ease a 9-year-old of 
today could navigate the digital world.
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Notes
1. The present regulatory framework is fragmented and dispa-
rate and focuses on the types of actors online instead of provid-
ing a more coherent form of protection that covers the entirety 
of the online experience (Leiser, 2019). Moreover, the EU 
and the United States are likely to pursue different regulatory 
approaches to specific problems because the First Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution will take precedence over many other 
goals (e.g., privacy).
2. Ubiquitous computing describes technology that, by virtue 
of its pervasiveness in everyday life, has become invisible to 
people (Weiser, 1991).
3. McFarland and Ployhart (2015) outlined eight discrete ambi-
ent stimuli that distinguish social-media contexts from nondigi-
tal contexts: physicality, accessibility, latency, interdependence, 
synchronicity, permanence, verifiability, and anonymity.
4. Meshi et al. (2015) proposed six features that affect the ways 
users interact: user identity, information format, text length, net-
work connections, spatial distance, and temporal scale (p. 7).
5. See Statista (2020a) and Columbus (2016). Although digi-
tal technologies are increasingly accessible, almost half of the 
world’s population, mainly in low-income regions, does not yet 
have access to the Internet. This striking inequality also extends 
to content production, which is mostly generated in developed 
countries across Europe and North America: “The global North is 
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characterized by the greatest levels of participation and is creating 
the bulk of digital content, while the global South contributes very 
little. Africa, in particular, is almost entirely omitted from these 
processes of digital generativity” (Graham et al., 2015, p. 97).
6. The cognitive limit on the size of natural face-to-face social 
networks is thought to be determined by a combination of con-
straints on available social time and cognitive bounds. According 
to this approach (the social-brain hypothesis; Dunbar, 1998), 
cognitive constraints are related to the size of the neocortex and 
associated information-processing capacity that, in primates, cor-
relates closely with the typical size of social groups. In humans, 
this suggests a social circle of about 150 people, with hierarchi-
cal levels reflecting both emotional closeness and interaction fre-
quency. These layers have values that approximate five (closest 
friends, or “support clique”), 15 (“sympathy group”), 50, and 150, 
and extend beyond this in at least two further layers to 500 and 
1,500 (Dunbar, 2016).
7. These numbers are based on estimates from https://www 
.internetlivestats.com.
8. It was a tweet by Japanese billionaire Yusaku Maezawa, who 
promised on January 5, 2019, to give away 100 million yen 
($924,000) to be shared among 100 random people (Brandwatch, 
2020).
9. “This means not just demographic or profiling data, but also 
behavioural metadata, such as those automatically derived from 
smartphones, like time stamps and GPS-inferred locations” 
(Kennedy et al., 2015, para. 2).
10. Further examples can be found at https://www.darkpat 
terns.org/types-of-dark-pattern.
11. A counterargument to the objective of algorithmic transpar-
ency is the potential for misuse and manipulation if their inner 
workings were made public—for instance, “Google bombing,” 
when web pages are artificially overlinked in order to push them 
higher up in search results. Trolls and bots can also game algorith-
mic filters by flooding social media with posts, thereby amplifying 
the posts in news feeds. However, these tactics do not depend on 
transparency—indeed, they are already in use. Furthermore, com-
pared with current, hidden designs, transparency and account-
ability can make algorithms less vulnerable to exploitation.
12. See Statista (2020b); Alexa (2020).
13. We are not aware of any analyses pertaining to Europe.
14. Lewandowsky, Jetter, and Ecker (2020) showed that the 
agenda-setting power of misleading news also extends to the 
American president’s tweets. In response to media coverage 
he considered threatening (e.g., the Mueller investigation), 
President Trump strategically deployed distraction (e.g., tweet-
ing about China, jobs, or immigration) to set the agenda for the 
mainstream media (e.g., The New York Times and ABC News), 
thus prompting less coverage of the issues he wanted removed 
from public discourse.
15. Although perceived exposure to false information can dif-
fer from the actual encounters with unverified and mislead-
ing claims, perceived prevalence of falsehoods online can have 
tangible consequences of increasing mistrust in the media and 
political institutions (e.g., CIGI-Ipsos, 2019).
16. Reference to “disorder” in this context does not mean that 
the blame is shifted to the user but rather that information dis-
orders are not there by design; they emerge as malfunctions in 
a healthy flow of information.
17. Note that the content considered “true” in this study was 
fact-checked content determined to be true; this is not represen-
tative of the broader category of “truth,” which includes legiti-
mate news stories that have not been fact-checked. In a similar 
vein, the study examined the characteristics of the fake news that 
indeed spreads, rather than the false stories that do not become 
as successful in spreading on social networks but stay unnoticed. 
We thank Gordon Pennycook and one anonymous reviewer for 
pointing out these two important limitations of the cited study.
18. The same study found that attentional capture is associated 
with retweet behavior in online moral and political discourse: 
Tweets with a greater attention-capture value (as assessed by 
specific words in the tweet) were retweeted more often (Brady 
et al., 2019).
19. Unfortunately, people are generally not particularly skilled 
at evaluating the trustworthiness of information they encoun-
ter online. Research in education suggests that young people 
struggle with many aspects of finding reliable information 
online—from selecting search results to judging whether a site 
is trustworthy. Students tend to ignore the source of informa-
tion, have difficulties distinguishing between traditional news 
and sponsored content, and evaluate sites on the basis of super-
ficial features such as graphic design and authoritative logos 
(Barzilai & Zohar, 2012; McGrew et al., 2018; Wiley et al., 2009; 
Wineburg & McGrew, 2019; Wineburg et al., 2016). The same 
dismissal of important information about the source of online 
news has been observed in a large sample of adult participants 
(Dias et  al., 2020). In a similar vein, only 9% of participants 
in Amazeen and Wojdynski’s (2018) study were able to distin-
guish advertising from editorial content. This ability seems to 
decline with age. However, when asked about trustworthiness 
of different news domains, people can successfully distinguish 
mainstream media outlets from hyperpartisan and fake-news 
websites (Pennycook & Rand, 2019a).
20. The evidence, however, is mixed: The link between mul-
titasking and cognitive control (distractibility) turns out to be 
weaker than previous studies have suggested (for a replica-
tion study and a meta-analysis, see Wiradhany & Nieuwenstein, 
2017). The general discrepancy in findings is also highlighted 
in the literature review on the minds and brains of media mul-
titaskers by Uncapher and Wagner (2018). At the same time, 
the authors of the review concluded that in light of the current 
evidence (both convergent and divergent), heavier media mul-
titaskers exhibit poorer performance in a number of cognitive 
domains (e.g., working memory; Uncapher & Wagner, 2018).
21. The data sets were from Instagram and three topic-based 
social networks.
22. According to Smith (2018a):
Half (50%) of Facebook adopters who think users have 
a lot of control over their news feeds have themselves 
attempted to influence the content they see there. But that 
share falls to 40% among those who think users have only 
a little control over the content of their feeds, and to 24% 
among those who think they have no control. (para. 5)
23. Rose-Stockwell (2018) argued that social media could pro-
vide users with curation tools for their own algorithmic filtering, 
such as prioritizing posts from family members, diversifying the 
spectrum of political news shown, ordering news chronologi-
cally, or filtering out posts filled with moral outrage. MIT Social 
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Media Lab has developed Gobo, a social-media aggregator 
with filters that users can control: https://www.media.mit.edu/
projects/gobo/overview/.
24. Some have suggested that the deliberate use of heuristics 
(i.e., cognitive strategies that ignore part of the available infor-
mation) is also an instance of deliberate ignorance. Hertwig and 
Engel (2020) have argued on conceptual grounds against this 
interpretation. Furthermore, there is an ongoing debate about 
whether voters’ knowledge of political facts (e.g., candidates’ 
positions on various issues) is a good proxy for the quality of 
their decisions, given that heuristics that foster good decisions 
using only a limited amount of information may compensate 
for a lack of political sophistication (e.g., Lupia & McCubbins, 
1998; but see Lau & Redlawsk, 2001). Outside the context of 
voter decision-making, there is ample evidence for the success 
of ecologically rational heuristics that rely on limited information 
(see Gigerenzer et al., 2011; Hertwig et al., 2019). The success 
of heuristics depends on reasonably accurate cue information. 
One of the cognitive tools that allows people to curate their 
knowledge base is informed deliberate ignorance.
25. For instance, online narratives of parents who report 
adverse effects of vaccines appear to be an important source 
of doubt about vaccination safety (the “narrative bias”; Betsch 
et al., 2015; Haase & Betsch, 2012).
26. There is an accessible computerized toolbox for creating, visu-
alizing, and evaluating FFTs called FFTrees (Phillips et al., 2017).
27. Like vaccines, which use a weakened version of a virus, a 
weakened version of disinformation does not entail the same 
level of risk as encountering such disinformation in an uncon-
trolled setting might.
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